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Monday, Xarcli 13th, 1871. 
LxEuTEsAh’r-Gmmm, SIR PERCY DOUGLAS, Bart., in tho Chair. 
NAXES of XEMBERS nbo joincd thc Tnstitution bctmcn the 6th and 13th 
3Znrch, 1871. 
AXR’UBL. 
i\Injor-Ctcncral~II.R.IT. tho Princc Christian of Schlcsxrig-Holstein, K.G. 
Ilnmond, Robcrt W., Licut. R.K. 
Digby, Ilonblc. E.C., Liciit. &en. Cfuards. 
I)arlorr, A. Prntt, Cnpt. Ropl  Berks Uilitia. 
Godmnn, Cliarlcs B., Lieut., Royal Sussci L. I. Militia. 
Gas, A. IE., Unjor h.-p. lato loth ILussars. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES O F  NILITAR,Y ORGA.I?IZATION. 
By Captain J. C. COLOJIII, Adjntant Limerick drtillery Blilitia. 
GEXERAL SIR c. T. NAPIEP. mid that succcss in war dcpends on thc fulfil- 
ment of two great principles-“ to be in thc right placc, a t  thc right 
timc.” I think this mnsim furnishes thc real clue to a solution of tho 
problem, “ Army Organization.” 
Thc 
naturc of distribution best adapted to our imperial rcqnircmcnts must 
first bc settled before organization can bc fairly and properly dealt with. 
Wc must know tlic places to bc filled and tho strength of tho forces 
required to fill them. This it  is the duty of distribution to dcterminc. 
Having done so, organization stcps in, creates thc forces, liolds them 
in readiness to be nt tlic named places a t  tho “ right time,” and sees 
that they am pro-dcd with cscry rcquisitc, and that they arc in creiy 
m-ay adapted to thc semicc they arc to perform. Without entcring 
into arguments or examples to establish its truth, I submit this fii-st 
general principlc to your consicieration. 
Now distribution has to do with place, organization with time. 
Organization i s  siitssrciciit lo Distrihtfioir. 
Now tho “right timc” is undoubtedly tho “momcnt war is dechred.” 
Tho question tliercforc is, what arc thc places to bc filled by military 
forces on thc declaration of war ? I n  No. liii of thc Journal of this 
Institution you mill find mF answer to the question, in two papcrs on 
tho “ Distribution of Our War Forces.” As tho principles thero pnt 
forxard are thoso on which I rest thc principles of “ Nilitory O r p  
nization,” it is nccessary I should briefly speak of them now. 
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GENERAL PIXh’CIPLES OF MILITAEY ORGANIZATION. 282 
1st. I show that it is a popular falhcy to supposo I‘invnsion” is our 
ollc p a t  danpr ; thesc islanils arc nothing morc than tho imperial 
b s c  of operations, and must not bo merely secured from capture b j  
3ssnult, but also from reduction by investment. 
2nd. To the Empire ns a whole 1 apply this principle, viz., IIThe dk- 
61 tribution of forces in such a manner as mill best secure tho imperial 
6‘ base of operations, ‘and cnsuro safety and freedom to tho impe&l 
4 6 communications .” 
3rd. I proposc to placo and keep forces in  such a position during 
pact as will best enablo them to act on the declaration of mar, no 
matter from what quarter it comes. 
4th. I hold that two armies arc required, ono a garrison, tho other a 
field Army, and I show that tho garrison Army is auxiliary to tho 
fleet, and that tho fleet is auxiliary to tho field Army, and that neither 
the distribution of the Navy nor that of tho Army, can possibly bo 
treated ns abstract or distinct questions: 
5th. I maintain that British military forces arc not required in 
peace to servo abroad, esccpt in India and tho 3Ccditerranean. 
As tho protection of our Colonies and possessions can best be secured 
by +fending their communications in mar, I proposc to throw their pro- 
tection in ~ a c c  on naval forces ashoro and afloat, supplemented by 
native marine troops. Instead of giving certain outlying possessions 
dehchmeuts of troops, I proposc to rear imperial fortresses a t  tho 
6 1  strategic points” of tho imperial communications, and to placo a t  these 
points in pence naval forces for shore duty, of a strength sn5cient for 
tho ordinary peacc emergencies of our Colonies and possessions in tho 
maritime districts, of which thoso points arc the bnso ; with a reservo 
of war vessels, which xvould furnish means of transport for thc garri- 
sons, and in which theso forces would cmbark in war, being then 
relicved by tlio garrison army. 
6th. The imperial strategic points are nnmcd in those lectures, and I 
submit they mould all require military garrisons in time of maritime 
war. 
Tho same i r a ~  which would threaten our homo fortresses would 
also threaten thoso in tho Nediterranean, and a combination between 
America and a European Power or Pon-ers would neecssitatc our filling 
up the war garrisons a t  tho wholo of tho imperial strategic points a t  
home, in tho Hediterranean and elsoivherc. 
I: definc tho Jcfensicc dutics of tho “ Field Army ” to bo as folloms :- 
“ To defend tho assailablo coast line of tho Unitcd Kingdom and to 
“ occupy and hold India.” Now this field Army ‘wquld bo nnablc to 
move without tho Fleet, and tho Fleet could not move from its great 
arsenals and bases of operation unless they arc secured by the gar- 
rison Army; hcncc it is that the organization of tho garrison Armr is 
of first importanco. I ts  strength I cstimato at 120,000. Thns-70,000 
for homo fortresses, 30,000 for 3Icditerranean, and 20,000 for other 
Foreign strategic points; considering that thcso aro 14 in nnmbcr, 
and that Bombay is onc of them, I cannot think tho cstimato too large. 
certab proportion iiiiist be liable to aiid held ready for serricc 
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290 GEXERAL PRIKCIPLES 
abroad. That proportion is rcprescntccl by tho forcc rcquircd for tho 
war garrisons of IIalta and Gibraltar added to tlic war garrisons which 
may a t  any timo bo rcquircd at tlio othcr forcign bases of n a d  opcra. 
tion; in othcr vords, a t  tho othcr impciial strategic points abroad; 
this, for thc sake of illustration, I nssumc to,bc 20,000. Thcrcforc, out 
of a garrison Army of 120,000, thc conditions under which 50,000 
scrvc must not preclude thc possibility of sending thcm on forcign 
service. Hcncc my rcason for thinking it a mistakc to supposc that 
our garrison Army can crclusivclJ; or in any lnrgcly prcpondcrating 
proportion, bc furnished by forccs only liablc to homc scrvicc, and con- 
scqncntly that thc common opinion that soldicrs in o third pcriod of 
scrvicc who arc to bc set apart for garrison serricc, and arc, a t  thc snmc 
timc, not to bo liablc to forcign scrricc, is false in principle. For tho 
snmc reason I mnintain that we cannot look to militia to supply tho 
garrison forcc rcquircd, thcy can only bc nscd to snpplcmcnt it. Tho 
applimtion of tho gcncral principle rcnders it tolerably clcar tbnt out 
of a gmrison army of 120,000 but 70,000 could possibly bc furnislicd 
by militia, or  any othcr forcc only liablc to homc s e r ~ c e .  
Thc ncxt gcncral principlc to which I dcsirc to draw attention is 
this :- 
A c o r t a b ~ i m l  proportion of the garrison Army m i s t  be fully fmi i iec t  
artillerynwi, aiid tho exact proportion is a matter of possil~lc cahrlatioia, 
Tho application of this principlc necessitates an cnquirx-&st, as to 
What is a fully trained artillcrpnan ? Sccondly, Wliat is thc certain 
proportion required ? 
Xow it appears by thc Dcfcncc Commission Rcport, that “in t!ireo 
‘‘ months mcn prc~ous ly  untrainccl might bc mndc capnl~lo of per- 
“ forming most of tlic dutics of garrison artillcry, mlicn supported 
(‘ by D duo ndmisturc of fully tminccl mcn.” And tho Rcport goes on 
to say, c c  thc proportioil of thoroughly hxincd and sliilfnl artillcgmen 
“ required for coast dcfcnces nppcars to clcpcnd, to some estcnt, upon ‘‘ wlicthcer tlio guns arc intcndcd to firc shot or shclls.” This was 
mitten in 1859 j wc arc nolr in 1871. I ask all prcscnt, with thcsc 
scntcnccs bcforc thcm, whether thc adrancc of artillery scicncc has oi- 
has not increascd thc proportions of tho “duo admisturc of fully traincd 
ar t i l lcrpcn” it is ncccssary for this cmpirc to mahtain as part of its 
the xatiire aiid extent of tlic works to be dcfeiidetl being P . i ~ O l S i l .  
garrison army ? 
’ Tho thcn Deputy Adjutant-General of Artillcry c as exnmined before 
this Commission, and p r o d  that at that dntc if “but oizeffoirrflb of thc 
guns mountcd lia? to bc manned, tlicrc rroulcl bc a deficit of 10,000 
traincd gpnncrs, and 10,000 nnsiliorics.” In thc face of this cvidcncc, 
and though tlic rccommcndation of thc Commission nddccl upmards of 
2,000 guns to the thcn esisting nnmbci; in ordcr to incrcasc our ficld 
artillery TO arc rcducing our forcc of garrison artillexy. The R o p 1  
garrison artillcry in thc Unitccl Kingclom is, according to Xr. Card- 
Tell’s statement, now 7,419, 155 lcss than tho numbcr at  tlic datc of 
the Dcputy Adjutant-Gcneral’s c d c n c c  rcfcrrcd to, and thc nnniber 
of guns now to bo mnnned at  komc is, according to thc Dcfcncc Com- 
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OF XILITAEY ORBANIZATIOS. 291 
mission Report, abed 2,700 morc. WC Imam, in fact, increased thc 
number of guns enormousl;F, and diminished t l c  number of fully 
trained gunners. 
you will find in tlic e-iidenco of Sir John Burgopc the following 
rcmarkablc P ~ S S ~ ~ O  :-“ Us fern   odd bc of citablishing works per- 
4‘ manently a t  very considcrablo cspense, and afterwards, perhaps, 
“being forced to abandon them for want of troops.” Now, Gentlc- 
men, “ works Iiam bcen cstablishcd at  +cry considcrablo expenso,” nnd 
I think thcrc nrc good grounds for beliering that thc “ duo ndmirturc 
of fully trained arti l lcrpcn ” (m-ithont rrhich thosc works might hayo 
to bc abnndoncd), is “ conspicnous.by its absence.” 
Eriidcntly tlic Commissioners did not consider n man of tlircc months 
training to bc CL fully trained gunner. The fall of Fort Anon, and thc 
siege of Paris, confirms tho view that four months’ tmining, crcn mliilc 
facing tho realities of war, is not sufficient to makc fully trained gar- 
rison artillerymen. Tlic ovidcncc g i n n  beforc tho Commission on 
Recruiting, by thosc who ought to know best, proves that it takes 
about two ycars to makc n gunner. Sncli bcing tho case, tho only 
fully trained artillerymen a~ailablc for garrison scrvicc are scrting in 
the ranks of tho Royal (Garrison) Artillery. 
By tlic cvidcncc given before thc Dcfencc Commission you will find 
that, in ordcr to sustain an cngagcment from any given nnmbcr of 
garrison guns, two-Hths of the forcc a t  least must be tiaincd nrtillciy- 
men. If, thcrcforc, wc rcquirc a garrison army of 100,000 for homc 
and Bleditcrrancrm fortresses, 40,000 may rouglily bo considered as 
about the nnmbcr of trained artillery necessary ; and bc it remombered 
that if circumstances rcquircd thc prcscncc of war garrisons a t  the 
othcr defended points abroad, 8,000 morc would bc sorcly nccdcd. To 
meet this possiblo demand mc ham not 12,000. 
Wc haw certainly a papcr forcc of militia artillery of about 15,000. 
Tho widcnco gkcn bcforc thc Defcncc Commission shows that thn 
militia artillery “ might fairly bc trusted dftcr sis months’ training, as 
“ auxiliaries.” Lord Airlie, in his lctters to tho “ Timcs,” cxplainccl 
that with tho ordinary timc and means allowed for training a militia 
artillery rc,&cnt, the men could only rcccim a f e F  dqs ’  instruction 
in gun drill out of one month’s training. 
It is cddcnt that as tho efficiency of the militia art i l lcg is incrcased, 
so tlic proportion of tlic ‘(due admixture” of royal artillcqrnen required 
for homc dcfencc diminishes. To makc an artilleryman, two things aro 
wanted, timc and means of instruction, such as guns, storcs, 6-0. It is 
USCICSS to crtend thc period of annual training or prcliminary drill if 
the appliinccs of artillery instruction aro absent. Now, considering 
that tho corps of militia artillcry arc scattcrcd over thc fucc of tho 
United Kingdom, is it rmsonablc to supposc modern oidnancc is to bc 
taken from the fortresses at  homc and abroad and scnt to places w h o  
it is not wanted cscept for merc drill and instruction pmposes ? Surely 
the great home fortresses hayo tho first claim for modern ordnancc nncl 
adillcry appliances, nest to them those in tho Bicditcimnean, and then 
thc other defended points abroad ? Arc m o  to rob thc imperial mm- 
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292 GENERAL PRIXCIPLES 
parts to supply corps of militia artillery north, south, cast, and Kcst, 
with mcans of instruction? If TVC arc not, then 1 say eithcr two- 
thirds of the militia artillery will annually be instructcd to use storcs 
and guns obsolete, or fast becoming obsolcte, or they must be exclusively 
furnislicd by the districts in the immediate neighbourhood of those true 
schools of garrison artillery, tho grcat home fortresses. In other words, 
militia artillery corps which are placed, or havc placed thcmsclvcs, in 
districts where there arc neith'cr forts nor batteries of great strategic 
importancc, should be convertcd into infantry, and the required pro- 
portion of militia infantry in the neighbourhood of home fortresses 
should be converted into artillery. For the samo rcason the hcad- 
quarters of the brigades of garrison artillcry should bo fired a t  these 
places, and thus the guns and stores supplied for actual service mould 
furnish the means of instruction for the Hoyal Garrison and tho Nilitia 
Artillery. 
Were these militia, artillery corps cmbodicd for one year at thcse 
places, which are thcir natural, and vould be then thcir local hcad- 
quarters, and each man joining subscqucntly had to undergo one 
year's instruction on joining, the proportion of the " duo admistnro " 
of Royal Garrison artillcrxmcn rcquircd for home fortmsscs might 
possibly be rednccd to zero. Under these circnmstanccs the strength 
of the Royal Garrison artillery rcqnired would be 20,000--12,000 for 
Mediterranean, and 8,000 for othcr foreign '' strategic points." The 
force of militia artillery mould be 20,000. Thus each brigade of 
Royal Garrison artillery \yonld hare a brigade of militia artillcry of 
ccrresponding strcngth attachcd to it-with the same head-quarters, 
the same staff of instructors, and under one control. Each corps of 
militia artillery would thus be annually trained a t  tlic guns they would 
have to me, and in the batteries they would have to man when called 
out for actual service. 
In a garrison army of h o w n  strength, a certain proportion must hc 
cngincers. The actual and exact numbcr of this force required depends 
in a great measure upon local circumstances. For the sake of illustra- 
tion, I assume it to be an avenge one-twentieth ; therefore, out of a 
garrison army of 100,000, about 5,000 would be thc numbcr of 
engineers. But when 20,000 garrison artillcry are requircd abroad, 
the proportion of engineers so required would be 2,500 ; this would 
Icave 1,000 deficient in home garrisons, and therefore nccording to  the 
proportion adopted for purposes of illustration, thero should bc a rescrrc 
of1,000 cnas wmxs. 
Now I leave it to Officers of garrison artillery and cnginccrs to say 
whether my illustration of gcncral principles is an over estimate of thc 
forcn of artillery nnd engineers rcquircd in this garrison army of 
h o r n  strcngth. Lt must be remembered that artillery and enginecrs 
can aln-ays act as infantry, but infantry cannot act as fully traincd 
artillery or engineer soldiers, and a garrison army without a due pro- 
portion of those arms is utterly and pcrfcctly ldpless and usclcss. 
The balance rcmaining after deducting these scientific branches from 
the garrison forcc, rcpresents infantry and the various contingcnt 
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OF MILITBEY ORGANIZATION, 293 
services, and consequently, if 50,000 may be rcquired abroad, of which 
82,500 mould be artillery and engineers, me must have 27,500 infantry, 
hc., liable to foreign service. -According to this illustration of general 
rinciples, the composition of tho garrison army mould be roughly as 
~o l lons  :-
20,000 ...................... R q a l  Artillery 
20,000 ...................... Militia Artillery 
27,500 ...................... Regular Infantry 
26,500 ...................... Militia Infantry 
5,000 ...................... Engineers 
1,000 ...................... Reserve Engineers 
100,000 
20,000 .............. Add farther infmtry reserve 
for home scrviicc in the event 
of all the foreign strategic 
points requiring nnr g d -  
sons. 
m c  now come to the “ Field Army.” 
For the occupation of India in  time of profound pmcc, we rcquirc 
60,000 British troops ; such being the case, and for reasons already 
given in the lectures before referred to,‘its reserve at the Imperial 
base, that is a t  home, must surely equal it. I f  this be a correct view, 
wo rcquirc a field army of 120,000 for this duty. Now no portion of 
tho force neccssag for the occupation of India, can properly be deemed 
as always amilable for the defence of the assailablo coast line of the 
United Kingdom. It is quite possiblo that n t  one and the same time 
wc m y  havc to defend India and the United Kingdom. If, therefore, 
the resenes and reinforcements for India am calculated upon as part 
of the defending force a t  home, they i~ould in that case be wanted in  
two places a t  the samc time. For this reason it appears to me to be a 
general principle, that the reserses and reii$orceiiiewts for  the adsaiiced 
force in India awst be coiisidercd as siqiernunterary to the force necessary 
for the dofence of the assailablc coast line of flie Utiited Kimjdom. 
As regards the field nrmy for the defence of that coast line, the &st 
point to  be settled is its required strength. There are hardly two people 
who agree on this subject. Estimates Tary from 80,000 to G00,OOO. I 
base my calculation on the application of this general principle. As 
an eiieiny’s form attacliing these Islands 2coiiZd be lintitecl by cbcionstances + 
coiiiiected with sea traiisport, the mnicrical sfreiigth of our Jield army of 
ilofeiiee may  be $xed by reference to tlie samc circidnstniiccs, y o s i d e d  its 
orgaiiizafioit a i d  qficiency be n o t  inferior to that of those f o r e i p  poicers 
d i o s e  geogrnpliical position makes ecen an attack possible. 
How me must ham a Channel Fleet to prercnt the reduction of the 
Imperial citadel by investment ; for the same reason we must haye 
fleets abroad. I f  we do not guard against L L  inrestment,;’ it is com- 
paratively usclcss our taking measures to prerent ‘( captnro by 
120,000 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
os
ko
w 
St
ate
 U
niv
 B
ibl
iot
e] 
at 
04
:32
 12
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
294 GEXCRAL rr.IxcxrLEs 
assault,” and so long ns KC h a ~ e  a Chnnncl Flcct, men supposing it 
to liavc mct with a rcvcrsc 01. to bo out-numbcrcd, it may, I think, bo 
fairly assumed thnt our cncmy could not with safety uso mnr flects for 
thc conmysncc of his armies. A combination bctwccn Prnssia nnd 
France against us would most directly thrcatcn our shores. Tho 
nggrcgatc stcam tonnngo of tlic merchant nsvics of thosc porcrs is 
only about 138,000 tons. I snbmit that to npply’this total means of 
stcam transport to a purely military purposc, would require much 
prcparation, involving a, fitoppnge of ordinary tide for somc months 
prcviouslg. All tho largo stmmcrs arc cmplcrcd on ocean lincs ; only 
about half arc at hand at any onc timc ; the smaller stcamcrs and tugs of 
coursc arc morc lilicly to bc always nvailablc. For thcsc and many other 
reasons, Ti-hieli I cannot trespass upon Four timc to girc, I do not sco 
that much morc than 70,000 tons of stcam transport wodd bc a t  the 
disposal of Prussia and Francc for military pnrposcs a t  any one time. 
Taking Captain Tulloch’s’ cstimatc as a guidc, I nssumc that cvery 
$tcamcr of 1,000 tons can carry 1,500 men, and tow four horsc boats 
ncrcss the Channel, and thcreforc 70,000 tons may bc taken to rcprc- 
scnt c o n - m p m  for about 105,000 men of all arms. Supposing our 
nrmics to bc ~i-ell orgmizcd and cfficicnt in cwry respect, I conclndo 
that 120,000 is about tho present rcquircd strength of tho field army 
for tho defcncc of thc assailablc coast lino; I say present required 
strcngth, bccausc as thc stcam merchant navics of Prussia and Frnnco 
arc dc.rolopcd, so must our dcfcnsim ficld am- j  bc incrascd. 
I submit tlicsc considerations to your notice, for it is ‘cry important 
that  wc should not wstc  mr rcsources by increasing our purely dcfen- 
sivc forces for homo purposcs out of all proportion to ncccssity or  
rcquircmcnt. By so doing we should bc rcdnciug our poivcr of attack, 
and nsclcssly maintaining military forccs only applicable to a purposo 
for which they arc not wantcd. I impress upon IOU thnt I am not 
maL<ng dogmatic asscrtions, I am mcrcly submitting points for your 
discussion. I am but a student in scarch of tlic true solution of tho 
problem, national z)r rnthcr imperial defcncc, and in that capacity I 
lay bcforc you what appears to mc to bc D gcncral principlc. 
Assuming my illustration to bc corrcct, tho total strength of our 
ficld army rcquired for purely dcfcnsirc purposcs would bc 240,000, 
about G0,OOO bcing in India, another 60,000 forming thc reserve for 
India, and 1’20,000 for tho dcfcnco of thc assailablc coast liuc. But in 
ordcr to placc 240,000 mcn a t  nny timc in thc field, allownncc must bo 
mndc for sick, casndtics, &c., which I takc to bc 10 per ccnt. ; thcrcfore 
to providc for dcficicncics so occurring, 240,000 must bc nddcd, so 0s 
t o  cnsurc our ficld army of 240,000 being always cffcctiw. 
As rcgarcls tho constitution of this field army 4 guns per 1,000 may 
bc considcrcd a fair allo-mncc. The \Tar csttiblishment of our field 
artillcry may bc tnkcn at 46, all ranks, per gun. According to Colonel 
Baker, about 20,000 cavalry would bo required. With rcfercnce to 
cnginccrs adopting tlic cstimatc of Najor Bcrnn Edwards, in  his 
* Sec “Thc Protcetion of London against an Inratling Forcc 1anGng on tho East 
Coast,” Journal, No. LIX. 
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OF MILITARY ORGAINIZATIOS. 295 
6‘ Orgmkation for tho Army of England,” about 4,000 would bc thc 
proportion. It is wcll nigh impossiblc to makc a f,+ estimate of tho 
number of train and contingcnt services. According to tlle Prnssian 
standard, about 14,000 train to 100,000 infantry mould, I bc!icrc, bo 
tho proportion. As, homcver, onc-half of our ficld army is for India, 
whcro thc rncn for tlds scmicc could bcst be supplicd by natircs, if the 
Prussiqn standard bo applied to that portion of tho forcc for homc 
dcfcncc, it may be considcrcd a fair allomnce. Undcr all thesc cir- 
cumstances, and for tho sakc of illustration. wc mill assumc thc ficlcZ 
army to bo composed as follon-s :- 
170,000:. .................. 
31,000. ................... 
20,000 ..................... 
4,000 .................... 
15,000.. .................. 
240,000 
Infantry. 
Ficld Artillcry. 
En,. wnecrs. 
T n h .  
Cavalry. 
Add untrained 
24,000. ................... or non-cffectivo 
all arms. 
264,000 
Remembering tho immcnsc amount of instruction and practical 
cspericncc required in order to makc a ficld artillery, c a d r y ,  cn,‘ wxcr ,  
and, I think I may add, train soldier, it is evident that nonc of thesc 
branchcs, even though intcnded for homc defcncc, can bc furnished by 
Nilitia, 01’ by any force not subjcct to long continuous traifling. ‘‘ Timc 
is money;” consequcntl1, to makc a man cficicnt in any of tlicsc 
branches costs a considcrablo amount. I thcrcfore think that thc 
services of rncn so trained should bc retained, until their cniciency 
bccomcs impaircd by reason of age. A rcfcrcnco to tlic cridcncc bcforc 
tho Recruiting Commission shows that aftcr 14 scars soldiers bccomc 
unfit for cavalry duty, and wval “ gcf into any bcrth in ordcr to get oub 
of riding :’ that artillcry soldiers arc complctcly vorn  out a$cr 17 o r  
18 years, though thcy may thcn bo considered “ fit for thc quiet scrvicc 
of garrison relicf;” cnginecrs, on thc othcr hand, maF bo rctaincd Tit11 
advantago to 21 ycars. Though thcre is no ovidcncc as regmils train, 
1 think it is’ likely rncn in  this branch  odd continuo as long cffcctirc 
as cnginecrs. It takcs a comparatirely short timc to makc’an infantry 
soldicr, and I think I am justified in saying that a man of sc-icn ycars’ 
scl.Ficc is a t  his.best, and mill, with annual training, continnc tho- 
roughly cfficicnt, so long as hc is physically fit. Now it appears that  
the s y s k x  of enlisting for long periods dcters men from joining tlic 
Army, and that tho most effectual method of retaining tho services of 
a man after the cspiration of his first pcriod is to offer him incrcascd 
idvantagcs if hc re-cngagcs. If thcrcforc tho first period of scrricc bc 
Sc-icn years, tho pri-iatc infantry soldier should, ns a rulc, bc discharged 
iFitli a snfficicnt rctaining feo on complction of his first term, bcing 
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296 QENERAL PRIh’CIPLES 
liablc to bc called in for service, and being subject to annual training. 
Thc cavalry soldier and artillery soldiery should bo induced to rcmain 
for seven years more, the cngineer nnd train soldier also. Thcsc latter, on 
completing 14 years’ service, should have increased ndvantages offcrcd 
to them if they rc-cngagc for a furtlicr term of 7 years. But though 
artillery and cavalry soldiers may C C ~ S C  to bo thoroughly cfficicnt a t  
thcir special work, after 1.I. years’ scrvicc they arc vnluablc men, in tho 
quiet semicc of garrison relief. I tkereforc propose to recruit tho 
garrison infantry force, liable to foreign scrvice, by re-cn,nn,&g cavalry 
and nrtillerysoldicrs at14 years for service in that branch of the forces 
mherc they would not actually bc requircd to serve abroad, except in  
war. It,will thus bc seen that there would practically bo a long scrvicc 
branch of tho Army, composed of artillcry, canlry, engineers, and 
train, the short semicc bnnch being thc infantry. 
I \rill now completc thc outlinc of tho organization of the garrison 
army. 
I propose tlirco great divisions, with fised head-quarters at  Chatham, 
Portsmouth, and Plymouth. To thc 1st I vould attach Woolwich and 
Dorer ; to the 2nd Portland j to thc 3rd Pcmbroke and Cork harbour. 
Each division to bo under a General of artillery. Thc regnlar forces 
in each would bo about 17,000. Tho garrison districts surrounding 
these fortified points yould in Grcat Britain furnish 19,000 Nilitia 
artillcry, tho sub-district of Cork 1,000. The 26,500 Nilitia infantry 
requircd. in war I would draw from the Irish Uilitia infantq-. Tho 
garrison artillery and engineers could bc loodized. These arms would 
supply tho peace garrisons for 3Lalta and Gibmltar, and I mould treat 
thosc placcs as great depats, posting mcn in their first period of service 
to thc depBt brigades stntioned there in peace, so that garrison nrtillery- 
men and enginecrs would ham beforc them, on thc expiration of their 
first engagement, homc service, a fixed position, and permission to 
marry as a cheap inducement to continue serving. 
To cach of these great garrison head-quartcrs would be attached a 
certain number of the imperial fortresses abroad, of which thc garrison 
divisional head-quarters would be the p a t  feeders as regards personilel 
and niat&riel. By drawing in from their own districts their Nilitia 
artillery reserres and the Irish 31iliti.z infantry, they could immediatcly 
supply the neccssary mar garrisons for our bascs of n a r d  operation 
throughout thc world. 
It will now bc understood that thc Irish garrison sub-district of 
Cork mould furnish 1,000 Militia nr t i l lq ,  the gnrrison districts and 
sub-districts in Great Britain, with their loml head-quarters at the great 
.- fortified points, would providc 19,000 ilIilitiaartillerj. Tho rest of tho 
united Kingdom, being divided into field districts, would only furnish 
3Iilitia infantry. Daring peacc the Irish 3Iilitia infantry mould bc 
attached to tho field army, and in war it would bo called in for garrison 
serricc a t  the grcat home fortresses. 
I hold that tho artillcry and engineers-both field and garrison-the 
cavdry and train, should erer be maintained at a war strength. It 
takes two years to make tho men of these forces, and, tkereforc, ;f the 
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OF Y ILITARY ORGANIZATION. 297 
country will.not keep thc Army required for its dcfencc always a t  
strength, I submit that the cxpenditurc on infantry must be re- 
‘1uced in order to procurc tho greatest amount of military efficiency 
mith the least possiblc out la^. If KO ha\:c a sufficient forcc of thesc 
special arms, wc can make ready for T T ~ Y  on six months’ notice. 
have not a suflizicnt forcc of artillery, cavalry, engineers, and train, 
although mc have the infantry, wc must ivait two jears bcforo \YO c;111 
place that infantry in thc field. 
h’om, it appears to mc that thc only possiblo way of reducing ex- 
penditure on infantry, without sacrificing its numci-ical strength, is by 
keeping it in a reservo or dormant stntc, and this can only be done by 
L‘loealization and short servicc.” India is tho diiEculty in tho way of 
short servicc, while Ireland is the “standing. diro discouragement to  
]ocalization.” India is, hornover, D p n d  foreign training-school, and 
the forces under instruction thcrc cost thc country nothing. Ireland 
being poorly cultivated, with great variety of ground in  a small area, 
is valuable as D great homc training-school. By looking at India and 
Ireland in this light a cluo may, perhaps, bc found to tho difficulties 
they prcscnt on approaching the organization of the infantry of the 
field army. 
Supposing it is desirable to havc in Grcat Britain ninc field districts, 
csch furnishing 9,000 infantry, that thesc districts am mapped out, 
and all the complicated work of distribution done, “ thc business of 
organization commences.” After deducting tho garrison districts 
furnishing the 19,000 Militia, organized as artillery, there would be a t  
present about 81,000 Militia infantry, or 9,000 in each Geld district. 
The computed strcngth of Regulnr infantry is 90,000, one-half at  home 
and thc other half in India. Thc term of scrvicc for thc mnk and file 
is seven pm, but the Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and staff, 
formini the battalion cadre, would be long-service men. Thc cadre in 
India must be kcpt full, that at  homc must either bc kcpt full, or thc 
means must bc a t  hand to fill it a t  any momcnt. It is not necessary to 
rclicvc thc Indian c a h e  bodily and bring it home, bccausc the time of 
the men filling it has espircd. It comes to cxactly the samc thing, 
whether tho men quit tho cadre in India or a t  home. What object 
would be gained by bringing the permanent cadre homc to be refilled ? 
Say a baktalion, 1,000 rank and fib strong, of seven years’ men, is 
raised and starts for India D ycar nftcrmards; while out, the casualties 
by death and invaliding woulcl bc about G per cent. per annum; mcan- 
cies so occurring must bc filled up from home ; and, consequently, in 
thc last ycar of service of thc men of the regiment thero would be only 
about G40 men whoso period had expired. Tho other 360 would be 
men in various stages of thcir term of cngagcmcnt. Arc tho cadre and 
360 men to bc brought home merely for tho sako of discharging 640 
men at home, instead of from India i‘ By such an arrangement soma 
of thc 360 mould spend their mholc servicc abroad on board tho trans- 
port, for their cng?gcmcnt would expire before the cadre could again 
movc back to India. It is evident that wcrc tho seven years’ scheme 
adopted, a cliffercnt system from that cxisting now must be introduced. 
If  
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298 UESERAL PEINUIPLES 
I thcrcforc proposo that each regiment consist of trro battalions, tho 
cadrc of thc 2nd bcing placed in India, thc otlicr bcing fixed in CL par- 
ticular locality in Qrcat Britain. The Officers and Non-commissioned 
O5ccrs to bc postcd to and rclicrcd from tlic 2nd battalion in rotation, 
by-rcgimcntal arrangcmcnt, the pcriod of scrvicc in thc 2nd battalion 
being fiscd. TLc '30,000 infantry mould thus bc organizcd in 45 rcgi- 
mcnts of two battalions each. This mould giro firc regiments, or 
6,000 regular infantry to cacli ficld district in Qrcat Britain, and, con- 
scqucntly, five pcrmancnt rcgimcntal head-quartcrs. To each of thcsc 
one-fifth of thc Nilitia in thc district mould be attachcd, or about 1,800, 
two battalions 900 stronq. 
AS regards Ireland, w-liich I propose to treat as thc great preliminary 
training-school for India, 24,000 is tlic numbcr required to balancc 
casualties in thc " ficld army ;r' of this thc proportion of infantry vould 
bc 17,000. Dcdncting the Foot Guards, which is and must crcr bc a 
special scrricc, w c  b a n  about 11,000 rcmainhg to form n, great Irish 
dcpbt. 1 would diridc Ireland into thc samc nnmbcr of ficld districts 
as Grcat Britain, thc head-quarters of each bcing chosen for " stratcsc 
reasons." Each division of Grcat Britain would thus harc its di&ional 
dcpdt, about 1,250 strong, in Ircland, thus cstablishing, a.  local con- 
nection bctwcen tho dirisional districts in Grcat Britain and those k 
Ireland. Each of tho 45 regiments would lLavc in Ircland about 250, 
mith an Irish dcpbt cadre. 
SO far, thcn, a c h  rcgimcnt would consist of 2,250 all rids, of 
which 1,000 xould be in India complcting training, 250 in Ireland under- 
going training, and 1,000 in rcscrvc at its fiscci rcgimcntal hcad-quarters 
in Grcat Britain. As an c5cicnt forcc must crcr be maintained in 
Ircland, recruits raised in Grcat Britain should bo ablc to takc their 
phcc in thc ranks bcforc thcyjoin the Irish dcpbts; thcrcfoTo such 
recruits mould rcccivc their first bistrnction a t  their pcrmancnt rcgi- 
mental hcad-quartcrs. A man joining an infant5 rcgimcnt mould 
Commcncc his instruction a t  its head-qaartcrs or its dcpBt ; if hc mcrc 
an English or Scotch rccrnit 110, would, aftcr about t h c c  months, 
pass to Ireland, and thcncc in abont onc p r  aftcmards to India, 
rcturning homc a t  thc cxpiration of his scvcn p r s '  scrvicc. I xrould 
affer €10 n, par ,  including training pay to that man, on condition that 
110 joincd thc 1st battalion, nndcrwcnt an' annual training, and \ras 
liablc to foreign scrvicc if required. Thc rank and filc of tllc \\-hole of 
tho first battalions would thus bc in rcscrvc, and tho cost of their 
maintcnancc would bo about S410,OOO o p r  added to thc charge for 
tlicir food during training, which I would not deduct from them. 
Undcr thc proposed nrrangcmcnt, in Grcat Britain, thcro would bc no 
m&ana filc of tho infantry of thcfield army in an activc state, sarc 
thc Guards, about 11,000 in Ireland, and .z certain nnmbcr of R c p l a r  
and Xilitin rccrnits undcr instruction, and casualty men awGting d&- 
charge. Tho battalion and dcpat cadrcs should, howcvcr, bc a l ~ a y s  
kept complctc. Tho period of SCI+CC viith thc 1st battalion should bo 
rcplatcd, SO as to makc tho numbcr annually passing into its mnks 
corrcspond with its avenge msunltics, thus ensuring the md-s always 
. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
os
ko
w 
St
ate
 U
niv
 B
ibl
iot
e] 
at 
04
:32
 12
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
3 
OF MILITARY OEGANIZITIOX. 299 
being kept full. Aftcr man had complctcd thc rcgulatcd pcriod in 
tho 1st rcscrrc, he should bc induccd to rc-cngagc for n further term in 
a 2nd rcscn-c, thc pcriod of training bcing rcduccd, and thc rctainiltg 
fcc Lcing also rcduccd, hc should bc liablc to forcign scrvicc, and not 
bC dischargccl until hc bccomes unfit for acti-ic srr-i~ce by reason of 
or infirmity, whcn 110 should rcccivc a small pcnsion calculntcd br h1s 
total scrvicc. Thc strcngth of this 2nd rcscrvc cannot bc ca lda tcd  
nnlcss tho tcrm of scrvicc in tho 1st battalion bc h c d .  Without more 
nccmatc information it is impossiblc to do so. Supposing it to b~ 
30,000, at $5 pcr man a Scar, the total pay clinrgc for 71,000 rank and 
file in rcscrvc, and 11,000 activc infantry in Ircland, would bc about 
g~00,oOO a scar. Undcr tho esisting systcm of kccping all our infamiry 
in an active statc, I calculatc 5 similar forcc ofmnl; andfile  onid id cost 
~~p\rarcls of S1,800,000 per annum. Each rcgimcnt mould thus have a 
3rd battalion of, say (350. Tho cadre should be kcpt complctc, and, 
thcrcforc, tho 3rd rcscwe and tho Irish dcpat would rcqnirc n battalion 
cadre. Thcre xrould bc t h c c  to cach regirncnt, two only on tho Biitish 
cstablishent. The Non-commissioned 05ccrs of tho tiro JIiIitia bat- 
talions would bc pcrmancntly cmploycd doing duty x-iith tho Non-corn- 
missioncd Officcrs of tlic 1st and 3rd battalions clnring non-training 
periods. Thcrc ~ o u l c l  bc standing forcc in thc Unitcd Kingdom of 
infantry non-commissioncd Oficcrs numbcring in tho aggrcgntc about 
15,000 ; thcy would bc tlic pickcd rncn of thc Army. Thcsc should bc 
~ c l l  paid, and rcccive good substantial pcnsions whcn physically dis- 
ablcd. 
About 1,200 arc Lifc and Horsc Guards j tho 
cavalry of tho Linc would conscqucntly bc about 18,800, or 30 rcgi- 
mcnts of an avcragc strength of about G25 ; of thcsc 8 would bc scrving 
in  India in a somc~vliat rcduccd strcngth, 22 a t  homc, say 4 in Irchnd, 
and 2 in cach divisional &strict in Great Britain. Thcsc rc,&cnts 
might bc constantly changcd, 0s at prcscnt; thcy would bc. composed 
of mcnmhosc induccmcnts to scrvc incrcascd up to 14 years, aftcr 
which provision is mnclc for allowing thcm to complctc thcir timc in n 
qnietcr branch of the Army. Tho c a r a b  stations bcing pcrmancnt, 
cach might h v c  a dcp6t of dcscrring rncn, in thcir sccond pcriod 
of scrvicc, for ordinary barrack dutics. In this way might the 
number of horscs be rcduccd in proportion to thc numbcr of men 
allowed to remain stationary. Tlicsc dcpDts would be attachcd to cach 
regimcnt taking up its quarters a t  tho station, tlic horscs of which 
would furnish tlic mcms of kccping tho rncn up to their rrorli. Thc 
cavalry should not bc rcstrictcd to any particular districts ; Ircland 
would bc probably its best rccruiting pund,  and a grcatcr nnmbcr of 
thcsc rcgimcnts might ham Irish namcs. 
Tho brigado of Guards ought not to bc 
without its proportion, 1,000, leming 30,000 for Lino scrvicc. Thcro 
muld  bc about 70 battcrics in India, a t  a rcduccd strcngth, and tho 
fidd artillcry forcc at home, taking R o p l  Horse Artillery and Royal 
Artillery togcthcr, would furnish about 78 battcrics at a war strcngth, 
I must 
As regards cavalry : 
AS regards field artillcry: 
15 in Ireland and 7 in each fiord district in Grcnt Britain. 
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300 GEXERAL PRIICIPLES 
here rcmark that, as I am only dealing with gcncirl principles, my 
figures must bc rcgardcd as merc illustrations and nothing more. Each 
ficld artillcry station in thc United Kingdom rrould bc pcrmancnt. As 
with tho cavalry, so with thc ficld artillcry. I would form dcpbts of 
dcscrving men in tho second pcriod of scrvicc; tlic strength of each 
depbt to bc cqual to the diffcrcncc bctmccn tho pcacc and war establish- 
ment of thc battcrics accommodatcd, and at tlicsc stations with thosc 
dcpbts I would placc thc additional war eqnipmcnt as regards cm- 
iioges, &c., so that, though tho ficld bnttcrics mould move about the 
country at  a peacc establishment, in thcir barracks would be cmry- 
thing required to cnable them to takc the ficld, cxcept thc horscs for 
thc sccond Linc. 
As regards cno&cers : No mcn of this force arc, it appears, rcqnircd 
in India. Tho proportion for thc brigadc of Guards would be 100. 
Allon-ing 300 to Ircland, tlicrc would bc 400 in cacli ficld district in Grcat 
Britain. 375 would bc about tlic proportion of train to complcto tho 
the Gnnrds brigade : thcrc would bc about 1,000 in Ireland, and 1,500 
in each field district. Thcsc two b r k h e s  of the ficld army could bd 
localized, thcy would only be liablo to semicc abroad in war. In pcaco 
the cost of their maintcnancc, bctmcen the pcriods of military training, 
would bc considcrably rcduccd by employing tlicm in tho military 
mannfactorics and supply departments in their districts. 
Of the 24,000, or 10 pcr cent., allorrcd for casualties in tho ficld 
army, 17,000 infantry lias bccn accountcd for; tlic proportion of the 
othcr arms would bc 3,100 artillcry, 2,000 c~valry, 400 ena@ccrs, and 
1,500 train; these would bc at tho various dcpBts and schools of 
instruction. Thus thc riding establishment, engineering school, ond 
all staff and contingent services would bc amply provided for. 
Thc geneid distribution of the ficld army mould be as follows :- 
Great Britain, 9 divisions, 23,000 ............ 207,000 
Brigadc of GuarGs, all arms ................ 8,500 
Ireland, 9 dcpbt districts, rcgular troops ...... 18,500 
Forccs in India.. .......................... 60,000 
294,000 
This 30,000 infantry, moro than the estimated Jcfc1isit.c strcngtli 
rcqnircd, rcprescnts the PossibiliQ of increasing, at  comparatidy 
.wall cost, thc offcnsivc poivcr of our field army. Tho machinery 
proposcd is, I think, adapted to both R voluntary or a compulsory 
system, to the maintenance of an cffieient Army of defcncc, and to tho 
creation of an A m y  of attack. Yeas by year wages arc incrcasing, 
while the parsimonious tcndency of the nation as regards military 
establishments in peace, is also increasing. This being thc case, it is only 
by making such armngemcnts as mill least intcrfcre with soldicrs fol- 
lowing civil occupations in pcaco that tho Army can, with any prospcct 
of GU<CCSS, compete in thc labour-market for men. . 
In conclusion,. I desire to d n w  attcntion to tho impossibilitr of 
arranging the tcrritorial tonndnrics of militarj districts by connties o r  
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by any ancient custom. In my formcr pnpcrs I did this for pnrposcs 
of illustlxtion, but uudoubtcdly thc district limits can only bc defined 
by,rcfcrcncc to tllc distribution of populations. It appcars to me that 
rcorpizntion, based OF thc county sFstcm and tlic csisting rcgimcntal 
will not bc dcsiiablc, bccausc these two conditions arc irrccon- 
cilnblc. 
I havc comprcsscd 
tllc contents of 1.10 pages of the first two parts of my gcncrd plan of 
Imperial Dcfcncc into this paper of 13 p a p  ; this Fill account for 
many shortcomings and deficiencies. I now submit t h c  gcncral prin- 
ciples to your considcration, vi th  an apology for thc impcrfcct manner 
in IVIiich they arc laid bcforc SOU. 
1 ] l o p  this rough outlinc d l  bo understood. 
Captain WIIE.~TLFX, R.X. : Wc nll grcatly admirc tlic phn which Cnptain 
Colomb has just crphincd to 11s. 1 considcr that tlic laat s i r  months knrc bccnonc 
of tllc crises of tliis countv, nnd I merely nish to E ~ O W  the ncccssity for adopting 
eomc plan similar to Captain Colomb‘s. Primin, and Russia arc now in closc 
alliance. Pnuaio has acqukcd immcmc wcalth ns tho rcsult of her latc war with 
Fmncc. Both nations ham lnrgc flccts-flccts, taken togctlcr, about cqunl to our 
om. Many Englishmen rely upon our flcct ns our first linc of dcfcncc. Wc ham 
1,ccn spcnding nbout Sl2,~.OOO upon thc N a v  in order to  find out what RC 
ought not to do, but I do not say this in the way of finding fault, bccausc it is nn 
nlmost ncccssary cxpcnditurc. Tho ship must be dcsipcd nftcr tho gun-tho gun 
1123 outrun tlic ship. 
Captain Colomb says that militnry organization depends upon n a r d  organization ; 
and what I irish to do L to show tho neccssity for Captain Colomb’s, or somcthing 
like hi3 principlca, bcing brought into ph1, bccauc so many rcly upon our first line 
of dcfcncc, our Navy. I n  thc prcscnt crudc statc of ships-with forcign nations as 
well ns our own-a n a r d  action must be wry much a matter of chance. It mag 
result, likc thc narnl action bctwccn thc first “ Monitor” and the “Mcrrimnc, 
in a clmnii battlc ; or tlic first shot that takcs cffcct may dccidc the battlc; wc 
cennot tell onc way or tlio other n-ith thc ellip3 wc lure, or that otlicr nations 
11arc. Our forcfi~tlicrs lcft UJ a u m c  for honour, weight, and power among thc 
natiom of thc world. I think i t  is our duty to conrcy to  our dcsccndants that 
zmme untarnished in honour, undiminished in power and weight. I think, thcrc- 
roore, that unlcaa somc alteration b madc in our prcscnt systcm, nnd somctkig of 
tlic chnnctcr of Captain Colomb’s plan bc adopted, thnt we may soon h3Fc to pro- 
nouucc the awfully tcrrific word3 for any nation-“Too latc! ” 
Captain JIOSEISOS, R.N. : It is with much plcasurc that I risa to thank Captain 
Colomb for thc r q  able I pcrfcctly 
a p c  mtk him in rill the Eadiug points that hc has adranccd in favour of consider- 
ing thc British Empirc as a whole. We mu3t ncrcr losc sight of the fact, that KC 
powcss that which otlicr nations do not posscss Tiz., an enormous Colonial Empire, 
and an immcnsc amount of floating wmlth. i i c  cannot, thcrcforc, limit our plan 
of opcrntions mcrcly to a dcfcncc of our skorcs. W o  must nlwnys regard the 
British Empire as a whole, and consider not mcrclyhow wc can dcfcnd our Coloniee, 
but horr our Colyial posscesions can bc madc to nid in thc dcfencc of our rast 
floating wcalth. W e  porscss nbout 4 G  Colonial posscs~ions, including our Empiro of 
India, containing in all about 220 millions of inhabitants. Tlic population of Great 
Britain alonc being about 31 millions, is nearly c q d  to thc entirc German Empire, 
and nearly doublo that of tho Prussian Kindom bcforc tlic latc Austrian war, for 
the population of Pruasia was only 18 millkns beforc thc Xcar 1866. This country 
p o ~ ~ ~ s c s  morcorcr crcry element of military strength in far greater proportion than 
pcr that hc has rcad beforc this Institution. 
“Imperial Dcfcncc :” Pnrt I, Imperial Strategy : Pnrt 11, Tho R c o r p h t i o n  
of our ?Kilitary Forces. 
rod. XI-. Y 
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~ q -  other country. All tlint is nccdcd ia orgnnixtion. Wc k n ~ c  only to consider 
what am tho rcquisitcs for carrying on warfare, to pcrccirc cur own superiority- 
t h q  nm men, mcncy, coal, labour-saving niacliincr~ and niunitions of war. Lct us 
but rccognito tho  fact that 1 Ib. of coal cfi’cctircly nscd in a high-prcssurc condensin2 
cnginc equals thc work donc by an  ablc-bodicd man in 2% hours, consequently stcan 
machincry a3 applicd so gcncrally in Grcat Britain in aid of our population in our 
ulnnufactoric3 and clscwlicrc, lins bccn citimatcd to cqual -tlm work annually of 101) 
millions of men. Tllis is totally irrcspcctirc of tho sariug of labour by thc uso of 
thoso mcchanical implcmcnts iiow so unircreal, that nrc I i G t  morcd by steam ; thcrc. 
for0 the cconomy in manual labour in this country sincc 1815 is incalculablc. Tho 
floating wcalth of this nation as rcprcscntcd by thc imports and cxports, amounts a t  
tho prcscnt momcnt to 530 millions sterling, irrcspctirc of tlic raluo of 1110 ships 
tlicmsclrcs, and also totally irrcspcctirc of all spccic imports, w11Si I haro no 
correct means of asccrtaining. l l i c  realized capital in thi3 country can hardly be 
cstimatcd, EO grcat has bccn its aecuuidation sinco 1815, but it must bc countcd nt  
t hoo~mds  of millions. I n  tlic last sistccn years alonc, or sincc tlia Crimcaii War, 
thcraluc of our im orts nnd exports pcr licad of population has ncarly doubled, for 
in round numbers $icy stand as 20 pcr 1 i cd  to $18. Thc iniporlancc of a gcncrnl 
plan of ofl’cnsirc and dcfcnsirc opcntions a3 submittcd in Captain Coloinb’s paper, 
will bc still morc npparcnt whcn wc obscrrc that he proposcs to rtrcngtheu our 
military dc Sts in rariou3 quartcr3 of tlic globe, and thus kcc cpcn our grcnt 
highway3 J’comnicrcc, for n-c must ncrcr lose sinlit of the fact tEat tlie cnorinou 
cspnnsion of oilp tradc and the inercnsc of pop&ion lias madc us grcatiy clepcndcnt 
ou forcigu wuntrics for our irriporfs of food. Thc nation has again becn Ecizcdwith 
onc of its poriocliml fits of pnuie. Thc position that Frnncc has bccn rcducrd to in D 
few short months, has astonislicd thcsc wIio‘n-o~il~l not rcad tho signs of thc times 
aright. For my part, ~1-1icn I rcad my papcr in this Institution in Xay last, I was 
firmly wuriuccd that D war bctwecn France and Prussin might bc cxpcctcd a t  any 
moment, nnd I trust now that wc 11arc bccn EO .ruddy awnkcncd to a senso of 
insecurity, that tlic countrr will takc an cnlargcd ricw of tlli3 grcat question, as wiU 
bc found so ably trcntcd in tlic papcr wc are callcd upon this night to discuss. An 
cfficicnt crgnnization, IiovTcrcr, suck a3 lms bccn so eomplctcly carricd out in Prussia, 
i3 a p h n t  of slow growth, but it would ncrcr liar0 arrircd at its prcscnt perfection 
had not D sound s>stcm bccn originally Ekctclicd out and -1-istcnt1y fdowcd. It 
is tliircforc impcratirc that we s ~ i o i i ~  ~ l y  rccognizc tlic Eat’&at this country i s  an 
islund, and not part of n contincnt like Prusia, and t l n t  thcrcforc cur plans ought 
to  bc mnturcd in conformity to our pccuhr  position. Oiic point of tlic Prussian 
.system must striko tlw lnojt su icrlicid obscrrcr, riz., tho npiditr  and fxiliiy with 
-n+iic1i it3 army can pS3  from ctcfcnsirc to orcnsirc opcrations. m not Prursia so 
mntnrcd her orgnnimtion, licr finnncial rcsourccs would ncrcr Iiare supported thc 
chnrgo conscqucnt on cnlling cut so rast n body of mcn undcr arms. 
Gc;icml LEFROY, R.A. : Ifliink that wc arc undcr obligtions to  Captain Colomb for 
luring distiictly brought bcforc US and bcforc thc public, not only on this occasion but 
ou scvcnl otlicr occasions, that wc arc not as n grcat cmpirc to ellrink into our ~hcll, 
and to consider th3t the imperial intcrcsts of Britain nrc boundcd by tlic four ECW 
of England. I cntircly 
and cordidly ccucur with him, a3 I also do v i th  tho rcmnrks n-hicli hare faUcn frcni 
Captain IKosc3~cn. But I confess that I Iiarc rend this papcr and listcncd to i t  with 
somcthing of thc fcclings \{-it11 which onc rcgnrds D magnificcnt dce ip  for n pnlaca 
that i3 proposcd without much r cg rd  to architcctud d i ~ h ~ l t i c s  or financial con- 
siderations. It seems to  me that n sclicmo so logical and sjmmctrinl is an illusion, 
a t  1cxt if w c  rcgard thc po l i t i d  organization of tlic British l’arliamcnt nnd t l ~ c  pos- 
sibility of its rcalimtion. I fw  cannot defend oursclrcs short of Inring n garrison 
Army of ~ ~ 0 , 0 0 0  tmincd aoldicrj always on foot, whicli I prcsumo suppcscs thcm 
complctc in all tho ncccssorics of an army; nnd D ficld Army also cctmtcd by 
hundreds of thowands in addition, tlicn I fcar we must remain inour present power- 
less state. I do not cntircly O ~ C C  m t h  Captain Colombin thinking that the Britkli 
forcca should bo wi t lu lnm from tho remoter parts of thc cmpirc. I rccollcct, as 
crcrybody clsc docs, that when the Romm caglcs turncd tlicir wings homcwd3, tlia 
IIc has Inid that d o n  with grcnt strcngth nnd clcnmcss. 
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Romlll prorinccn soon ccascd to  be &man prorinccs. And I bclicvc if Endand with- 
clrsnr llcr troop3 from llcr cfistaut posscssions, thcy dl soon ccajo to add to file dignity, 
,llC priclc, or tlic powr  of thi3 cmpirc. 1 cntircly disscnt froln thcliotion t h t  wc can 
Bnf,.ly w i t I i c h ~ ~  our troops from our distant posscssions, on tlic assumption tllat r c  
o.n again launch thcm forth a t  short noticc ivhcrcvcr tlicy may bo rcquircd. TVo 
ellall ~ssurcdIy be clisappointed if wc crcr act upon that idca. And r l ly  should 
we deprirc OIIr AnnJ Of that hrgc CXpCricnCC, that acclimatization, which m&cs D 
bc lyof  Dritidl milit:irynicn in mnny rcspccts dilrcrcnt from any otlicr military body 
ill world? 1111 intc~ligcnt Olliccr of ahnost any foreign army invited to a Britbh 
111cs3. and conrcrsing with those around him, is struck bF thc pcculiarity aoc1 tho 
raluc of thnt cspcricncc of distant countrics d i ich  thcy liarc acquired U I I ~  (1ispIay 
cnz,ily and without prctcnsion. I harc hcard it often rcmnrkcd,and for my o m  part 
ellall bc cstrcmcly !orFy to SCc thc pohy  adoptcd which sccms to bc n o r g i n i n g  
tllc public car, of lcarin- to 10cd milith, in countrics nhcrc labour is 80 liigl J paid 
tlrat wd know wry r c h  what a lorn1 militi3 gcnenlly becomes, tho custody and 
gunrdimijhip of interest3 which nrc not only our propcrty but tho inheritsncc of our 
cI1ildrcn, of tcrritorics rhich arc not only our3 but theirs. I cannot scc tlic msrlom of 
,-onccntnting our A m y  a t  homc, subject to  tlic caprices of Parliamcnt or to tlic 
~ ~ ~ ~ C I I C ~ C Q  of party. T i W i  tlic system rliicli s c  knos  has gcrre on for thc last thirty 
p r s  mid nil1 go on for a long timo to comc, tlienc capricious hot fit3 and cold fits, 
,&cli &ct the dcfcnccs of tlic country; what,I di~iild likc to h-nor, would bccomo of 
tllc?10,000 mcu of tllcgnrrison Army byand-by alicn D scvcri) rc-action takcs plncc 
a d  wc bcgin to cut down ngain? I liko that conccptioii of Wcbstcr’s, D poctic 
imogc often quotd ,  wher~ Iic S P C ~ S  of tllc roll of our morning drum encircling thc 
globc. The roll of our morning drum should cncirclc thc globc vliilc Providcncc 
coinmits to our cam so g r a t  n portion of it as ab prcscnt. But if, on tlic p u n d  of 
fillancia1 diUiculty, we lcnrc thcjb thing3 to takc their cliancc, frust to tho forbcar- 
ancc of otlier I’orcrs, deluding oursclrci into tlic bclicf that tlicir ambition is 
going to slumber, forgct hor during thc last two gcncntion3 tbcsc nations Inrc  
bqn  working up inorc and morc to a lcrcl wit11 113 on all tlioso point3 in rhicli our 
inpriority csistcd at  tlic beginning of thc prcscnt century; I6ay, if s c  act upon 
t.liat principlc long, nc shall find oursclres xvhcrc Holland, Vcnicc, and otlicr States 
of 61nnll extent and onco p a t  cncrgy a t  lnet found tlicmeclrcs, wlicn ~~IGAiicss  
and corruption l i d  donc tlicir xrork, s h c n  t h y  had “but a namc to livc, but wcrc 
dC3d.” 
Captain P. TI. CO&D, R.N. : I shoulc~ like to ask thc Iccturcr to corrcct tlic mis- 
a prchcnsion into shicli I think Gcneml 1,cfroy 1133 fallen. I havc no knowledge of 
tic p a p  cxccpt from lienring it a d .  but I 1m-c not in tlic slightcit dcgrcc unc1cr- 
stood that thc English caglcs arc to bo withdnn-n from our colonic3 a3 thc Roman 
TICS ivcrc witl idnrn from theirs. I 11arc understood tlic contrary; that i t  i3 thc 
Iccturcr’s intention to makc thc English caglcs strongcr a t  prcscnt in our colonies; 
only, as I think I understood him, not in a military form. I think hi3 idca is, that 
looking to tliosc political accidents which General Lcfroy very propcrly alluded to, 
he Iiaa made it clmr to his o m  mind t lu t  s c  r i l l  not in timc of pcacc kccp my- 
thing likc D military forcc in any colony nliicli m-ould bc inapablc of protccting i t  
during war. I think his idca is, that  r c  ~hould mislead thc colonics by kccping up 
a form in pcaw n-hich s o  nsght probably ivitlidmw during s a r  ; a t  any rate, TO 
ehon~d lead thcm to rely upon a forcc nhich is not really c a p b h  of defending them. 
I understand his idca of conccntnting thc forccs in England to be, that wc should bo 
prcpnrcd to let loosc thosc forccs for tlic dcfcncc of tlic colonics in timc of war, nnd 
t h t  we arc to keep up thc strongest and closcst conncction +tli thcm, and to let 
foreign nations h o w  that IW do hccp up this closc connection bs tlic prcscnco of n 
h g c  uaml force. I think that to bc tlic r i cv  of thc lccturcr, and I hare merely 
h c n  to corrcct what I thought a mtapprchcnsion. 
Cnptain IIOSEASOS: I hnrc onl to  obscrrc, that had not that bccn m y  conception 
of Captain Colomys pnpcr I sho& ~iavc nriscn to oppcsc liis ricws. But I imagino 
h t  ho meant tho fircat pirots of operation to bc mnintaincd by thc Armics of Eng- 
lend i thnt it was only on thc diffcrcnt eclcctions that 110 grounded kij plnn, nnd not 
0:1 the abmdonmcnt of tlic colonic3 by English troop$. 
Pf! 
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Tiic CIUI~XAS : I think I can cxplnin thc cliscrcpancy. Cnptain Colomb ha3 
condcnecd liis Iccturc; I liarc rcad h h  book, and that part which rclatcs to the 
dcfcucc of tlic colonics had bcrn dclincatctl. 
I mould withdraw tho 
t roop  from certain of our coIonics and karc Etratcgic stations tliorou~lily protcctcd 
by naval forccs in timc ofpcacc. I Fay that thcrc arc certain impc4n1 stratcgiml 
points aliicli wc arc bound to hold against all nations. I would dcfcnd tho cmpirc 
by thc conccntration of brcc at  thosc points nhich arc ncccsrary to thc EafCty of thc 
impcrid roads. 
Coloncl JEILTOIP, R.E. : Captain IIoscason lms in a g c a t  mcasurc forestalled 
mc in what I iiitcndcd to “7. I agcc  gcucrally in tho rices cxprcssed by 
him, and in thosc of Captain Colomb, as rcgurds loolrin,n n t  thc rlcfcncc of 
tho Uiiitcd Kingdom from an impcrial, and not mcrclF from a local point of 
ricw. I may rcinark nith rcspcct to thc obscnntions of my fricnd, Qcncrnl 
Lcfroy, that *uliilst h o  is of opinion that Captain Colomb has suggcstcd the 
building of a pnhcc without rcfcrcncc to .cxpcnsc, hc himself proposcs to build 
a nliolc city of palaccs, rc Whilst Captain Colomb sug  
gcstcd a gcncrd schcmc nhicrmight bc rcduccd or cxpandcd in proportion as thc 
funds a t  thc disposal of Gorernmcnt nould pcrmit, tho sclicmc of p r o ~ d i n g  impcrial 
grrisons of suilicicnt strength to bc of any usc in thc Australian, tlic Canadkn, thc 
South African, or tho Wcst Indian colonics, and in tho many othcr colonial posscs- 
cions of Grcat Britain, mould, I rcnturc to think, if you w i l l  take lip a shcct of 
papcr nnd wlculatc tlic cost, bo found impracticablc. B small im crial fcrco in 
Canada would only bc a tcmptation to our ncighbours to attack us. f f  011 lcarc D 
forco in Australia, you only do work that tho Australians can rcry we6 do thcm- 
sclrcs, and which tlicy will probably do a pcnt  dcal bcttcr if IOU lcarc their internal 
dcfcncc to thcmsclrcs. I renturc to think also that tho prcecnco of a British force 
on thc Capc fronticr is a temptation to thc colonists to indulgc in KnEr Tars, which 
Iiarc, I am told, bccn a EOWCC of commercial adrantagc to many of thcm. Tho true 
policy of tllis country in rcgnrd to its dcfcncc, is, first and forrmost, a pent  na rd  
policy. As both tlic lccturcr and Captain Uoscnson haro rcmnrkcd, onr  hips must 
command thc communications of our merchant ship3 during wnr, and in order that 
thosc ahips may liarc bascs of operations for coaling, for refitting, and for Elicltcr; 
placcs such a3 Simon’s Bay, a t  tho Cap ,  Port h u i s ,  a t  tho IInuritim, Trincdmalee 
or Gnllc, a t  Ccjlon, IIong Kong, Bcrmuda, Ihlifas, Qibmltar, Malta, must be 
maintaincd as n a r d  stations, and thcsc places must bc madc strong in thcmrclrcs. 
They must not bc dcpcndcnt upon our flccts to  protcct thcm. Thcy nrc tho bass  of 
opcrations that must bc dcfcndcd during the nbscncc of tho Flcct, EO that when 
ehips rcpnir to them to coal, and to bc supplied with prorhions and to  refit, they 
may find tho coal thcrc, they may find thc mcans of refitting thcrc, and they may 
find thc mcans of shdter thcrc, whib they nrc refitting. sueh nrc the objects of 
thcsc placcs. Thesc n a r d  stations should certainly be garriaoncd by im crial forces. 
This, hoxcrcr, is a rcry cliffcrent matter from the garrisoning of co1oni:ifposscssions 
which arc not rcquircd for the-support of our flccts. It is a question of arrnngc- 
ment whcthcr tho n a r d  stations should bc grrisoncd by purcly military forccg, i e . ,  
by troops of tlic Line, or by marines, or by sailors hndcd for tho purpose. AB 
bctaccn mrincs and troops of the Linc, it. is a m t t c r  for considcration bctv-vern the 
Admiralty and thc War 05cc. and probably it is of no g c a t  conscqncnco under 
nhich Dcpartmcnt thc garrisons for our n a r d  stations arc maintained. Thcrc might 
perhaps bc ccrtain ndrnntagcs in placing thcm nndcr Admiralty jurisdiction. I 
only rosc, liomcnr, to giro my adbcsion to thc gcncral principles of tlic lecturer, for 
I Iiarc not gouc into his details su5cicntly to be able to form nu opinion upon thcm. 
But n h t c r c r  conclusions may bc nrrired a t  rrspccting tlic details of his proposals, 
I nm suro nc must all ngec  that it is wry cliccring to hear the question of our 
naval and military dcfcnccs trcatcd in the comprclicnsirc manncr in which they hove 
bccn r c p d c d  by Captain Colomb. 
ff eneral LEFROY : X y  fricnd Coloncl Jerrois put m word into my mouth that I did 
not usc j I enid nothing about great forces in thc colonies, wh3t I said was that the 
British scarlet ought to he there, I do not a r e  how small the force may be. I (lo 
Captain J. C. R. COL~IID : I can only say that it  is, SO. 
rdlcss of thc cost. 
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not- that 70,000 men should bo in Canada, but I do say that the Dritijll 
cnsln should bc there, if it i3 only n corporal’s guard, and I n-ould rather hare 
tllatOcorpord’s guard thcrc, if war broke out in America, than 11ar0 ody  colonial 
troopj. Colonel E-ELYS: I n  tho rerr intcrcsting spccclics that 11arc bccn dclircrcd this 
ercning, I hare bccn someirhat surpriscrl nt not licarino morc about tho details ,f 
Amy organization. I take it tliat thc gcncral principles oPmilitary orgnnization s1ioulc1 
consist of kecping your troops, when 011 pcncc.cstnblislimciits, aln-ays fit for tllc rcccp- 
tion of an enormous acccssion to thcir nombcrs \Then put on a war footing, I think that 
is tllc Innin thing-that yourarmy on n pcacc footing should bc of modcmtc strength, 
but should be fitted for tho rcccption of rnst ncccss of nurubcrs in timc of xyar. I r e  
s l l ~ ~ l d  ccrtainly lcarn from our ncighboms whcn w c  can, and it is obserrnblc in the 
late war that tlic Prussians did not raise n ncw battalion, or a single new battcry or 
squadron, d i c n  t h y  went to war. Thcy had the cadrc of ercrything reacly, thcr 
llnd only to recall their old soldiers to their colours, and thcir army was at onco on 
L xrar footing. \\‘hat should n-c do if wc had to take tlic field nith 150,000 rncn in 
Belgium or elscahcrc ? \\-e should harc to raise new rcgimcnts, wit11 OfIiccrs nnd 
nicn LnoKingnotIiing of each othcr, iu fact, KC should Iiaw to rcorgnnizo our Army. 
liare n t  prcscnt no organization for tho rcccption of tho rncn crcn if we had 
dcquntc reserrcs. Though it is true that young soldier3 figlit extremely well, I 
think it is doubtful whcther n ncw rcgiment fight3 as wcll as nn old one. I f  you 
llarc an old rcgiment, xvitk esprit de corps, and historical associations, I think you 
may infuso into its ranks n number of recruits, without diminishing its efficiencv. 
But if you form your recruits into iicw battalions, you do not gct n force t h t  cin 
b~ dcpcndcd upon. F o r  the Prussians hare shown us that largc companies nro not 
an inconrcniencc on sirricc. They liarc companies of 260 rank nnd file, and harc 
shown us that that is n good and ucful  number in nn European ampaign. I f  that 
ia the cnsc, we hare at oncc n simplo mcans of clianging a t  nny timc our infantry 
from a pcnco to a war footing by raising tho compa~~ics from thcir prcecnt small 
strcnsh up to 200, nnd 260 rank nnd filc cach. If  that be possible, we could with 
our prcscnt organization incrcasc our forcc four or fire fold, nnd put them on n 
war footing without raising n singlo ncw rcgimcnt, though this would, of coursc, 
neccssitatc tlio division of our prcsent regiments into trro or t h e  battalions. Thc 
aemc principle might be applied in n g e a t  degrco to tlic carnlry and artillery, though 
thoae spccial nrms ought certainly to be licpton n muchfullcr strength than infantry, 
because they take much longcr to prcparc. I understood Captain Colomb to 
recommend that the Militia, particularly the Artillery Militia, should bo out for a 
year. (Captain COIOXB : That in crcry caso tho llilitia shouldharo n p r ’ s  training 
when first cmbodicd.) I hope in the course of two or tlircc ycars that tlio Xilitia will 
be embodicd ; but it is tlic fact that a t  this momcnt tlio Xilitia could not bc cmbodicd ; 
it  is not in the powcr of the Gorernmcnt to embody tho Xilitin, unless wc arc in n 
stste of war. It is a g e a t  pity that tho tcnns of n militiaman’s scrricc nre not 
simplified. Therc has alnays bccn somc extraordinary rcstriction iutroduccd into 
tho Act undcr which he scirrcs. It lias Icd to nll sorts of misundcrstanding3, nlmost 
to a mutiny. Whcn I first bclongcd to tho Militia, tho men n-crc only bound to 
sorre when the country m-as in “imminent dnngcr of inrasion,” not during my 
wsr; but thc men wcro thcn callcd on to ierrc during the Crimcan war whcn thcrc 
WFH no danger of invasion, and t h y  wcrc cmbodicd under n-frcsli Act. But the 
men who had bccn prcriously cnrollcd undcr tlic old Act said, “ \Vc won’t stay ; nc 
erc only liablo to bo cnibodicd in cass of imminent danger of iumsion, nnd yon call 
US out now whcn thcrc is no dangcr of iurnsion.” Thc Militia was rcally rc3uccd 
to R statc that was drcadful. Thc 
ivgimcnt to which I bclongcd bcharcd, compamtircly spcaking, particularly wcll ; 
that iS to my, not mom than one-third of the rncn rcfuscd to comc to parade. I 
h r c  you to y w s  how some othcr rcgimcnts bchared. Well, the Gorcrnmcnt had 
to gire R ~ Y ,  bccausc thc men wero in the right, and Cforcrnmcut had to let any 
militiaman who likcd, hare his clischargc, and thoso who wero Killing to rcmain 
WCN: rc-attcstcd undcr tho ncw Act, nnd rcccircd n nctr bounty. Tho Act whicli 
in forcc mlien most of thc rncn now scming in tho Militia wcro’cnrollcd, docs not 
It was for n timc only fit for disbandmcnt. 
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rcndcr thcm liablc to p c m n c n t  scrricc csccpt wlicn tllis country is at a a r  ; EO that, 
unlcse wc arc at  mar with Eomcbody, \r-c cannot embody tlic gcater portion of the  
mcn wlio now form tho Militia ; it is only tlic mcn who harc bccn enlisted eincc tho 
9th of A n p s t  last, wliicli i3 tho datc of tlic ncw Act, who arc now liablc to bc called 
out for embodicd rcrvicc. llicrc i3 still a stipdntion in thc pwscnt Act w l~ ic l~  map 
bc thc ground of fiiturc complications. It i3 that they could bc only bc cnllcd out 
on R “grcat cxucrEcncy,” vliatcrcr tlint may nicnn. TV1iatercr a “ great cmcr- 
gcncy ” may mcau, it can hardly mcan tlic normal statc of aEiir3. Xoa, as Captain 
Colo~nh thinlie, and a grcat many othcr good judges tliinli, that n certain portion of 
thc Militia should allrraj-s bc cnibdcicd, it is a qucitioii whcthcr tlic men would not say, 
“ Oh no, we only cnpgcd to scrrc iu a great cmcrgcncy, lion can you c d  us out t o  
scrrc alien thcrc is 110 cmcrgcucj in particular.” So it is to bc hopcd that thcrc will 
bc anotlicr Militia Act broiight in, in srhicli thc word3 “grcat cmcrgcncy” ail1 bc 
left out, and that tho Sccrctary of Stale for War will Iiarc thc pon-cr to call out the  
Nilitin wlicncrcr Iic thinks it ncccssary. 110 should bc tho rcspousiblc man j it  should 
dcpcnd upon him, and not upon tlic militiman to may wlictlrcr tiic force should bc 
d c d  ouior not. 
Licutcnant Colonel L a n r ,  R.E : I beg to add my tcstiinonj to tlic r d u c  of thc 
nancr that lins bccn read. and to thc ablc manner in which Cnptain Colomb has re- 
capitulated tho princi lci which ought to bc bornc in mind by all thosc wlio consider 
our matary  and narai’ rcorgauization. 11clia3 very properly pointed out that tlic t w o  
subjccts cannot bc coujidcrcd separately, nnd I am much inclincd to think tlmt thc 
nard and military organization of this country will not bc put on a 
until thcrc i3 ono W a r  Minister, a110 shall clircct the policy both of t \ ~ % % ? ~ ~  
aud tlic War Office. Of coursc, to cnablc nu indiricliial to do thie, it  would bo 
necessary that 110 ~ l i ~ u l d  be relicred from tlic adiuinistntirc details of thosc dcpart- 
mcnte, and from tlic responsibility which now dcrolrcs on tho Eccrctary of Statc 
for War, and 011 tlic E’kt Lord of tho d+ni id ty  rerpcctirclj-, in rcspcct of decisions 
on tcchnical qucrtions. Such n coursc, if it should crcr bc ndoptcd, would cnnblc 
tlic l i cad~ of thc naval and military dcpartmcnts to bc talrcii morc frcqucntly from 
Oficcrs of distinction in their rcapcctirc scrricc3, aliosc opinions mould be rcgardcd 
with confidcncc by the country and tlic scrriccs. 
I takc this opportunity of obacrring, with rcfcrcncc to  d i n t  thc lcctnrcr and 
Captain lloscason hare said, that I do not tliink tlic conntry or thc l’arliamcnt can 
be acczcd of parsimony in dealing with tlic nnral and u i l i t av  ECIT~CC~. I bclicrc 
if thcy l i d  p t c r  confidcncc in tlic administration, t h t  tlicrc would bc no hck  of 
fund3 to carry out thc ncccssary rcforrns. C:iptain I I o s c ~ o n  told us that tlierc arc 
firc hundred millions of t n d c  annually afloat on tlic ENS. It i.3 cqually truc that 
wc par for our naval nnd military scrriccs a t  home and in India a sum npprmclihg 
~~0,000,OOO n scar. Kow, 8 per cent. is not a loic n t c  of insunncc. I bcjicrc 
that tlic nioncy now EpCnt would, if aclminirtcrcd to thc grcatcst advantage, producc 
a nard and nulitary forcc that England nccd not bc ashamed of. 
With rcry slight qualifications I m prcparcd to cndowc the gcncnl principles 
that Captain Colomb has Inid dom. I think it i3 a qucstion whcthcr the colonial 
stations cnumcntcd in hh prcrious Iccturc,-x\ itli tlis singlc cnccptio~~ of Bcrmucln, 
which I tliiiik ought to bc placed on tlic Eamc footing as Qibraltar and Xalta,- 
shoi!ld not bc lookcd u p n  as nard  stations. I liarc long adrocatcd that tlic infantry 
prrieons of thorc stations mhoilld bc taken from the lloyal 3Iariucs. As rcgrdo’ 
Canada and Australia, ahcn I first wrotc on thb  qucstion, I submitted forconsidcra- 
tion that it m s  desimblc that w a k  sccond battalions or cndres should bc licpt in 
thosc colonic~, to bc filled up in timo of Tar b mcn who had passed through tho 
ranks of the r cp la r  h y ,  and who liad sc t t l c i  in tlic colonics. I bclicrc in that 
way thc outflow from emigration, which is stntcd to bc onc of tlic obstaclcs to 
rccrniting, might bc m d c  thc mcans of filling the ranhs of our army in our colonie3 
in timc of war, nnd of attaching to  the British colonies a dcsinblc class of scttlcr3. 
It would bc n gain to our militnry forces if a large proportion of mcn, all tnincd 
soldiers, of from 3 to 21 scam’ scrricc, could bo induccd to ~c t t l c  in tho colonic?, 
with the liibiity to join a battalion in that colony. We should thereby mcct Gcncral 
Lcfroy’s point of fljing of our flag in t$c colonic-., and at tlic s m c  timc d d i g  to 
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Ollr military forces at littlc cxpcnec to the Impcrial Clorcrnnicnt. With tlint single 
qudjflcation I niii prcparcd to  cndorsc tlic gcncral principlcs of coloihl dcfcncc 
I sllal~ nox pass to  somc of tlic details that hc has indicatcd. IYith rcprcl to the 
c1etai13 of tlic scrvicc with aliicli he is morc particularly copizant,-tlic artillcrg 
scrvicc, I llarc littlc to say, I think lie has taken right ground in proposing t113t 
thc artillery corps sliot11d !~YC pcrmancnt had-quartcrs. I wrould bcg tho mccting 
to bcur in niind that tlicrc is a great distinction bctvcen I ‘  crinancnt Iicad-qunrtcr3” 
and ~~lornlization.” 1 think, howercr, that tho nmibcr ofPZlcrmnncnt Iicad-quarters 
llC l1a3 indicntcd for thc arrillcry is rather limited. I n  adhtion to Chatlinm, Ports- 
moutll, and Pljmouth, I think tlicrc nro othcr stations throughout thc countrj, for 
c s ~ ~ i p ~ c ,  tli  JIcrscy, tlic IIumbcr, thc T p c ,  thc Firth of Forth, and Ilarwich, a t  
rrliiclh opportunities could bc nftbrdcd for tmining artillcrpncn in tlic mmagcmcnt 
of hC3-q- giiIi3. Con~idcring that tlic artillcry scrvico is that to wrliicli our lodizcd 
Yifitis and Volunteer forccs can in inany C ~ S C J  bc most ndnntngcously trained, I 
tliiiik it would bo dc~irablc to hare a largcr numbcr of nrtillcry hcad-quartcra. 
ncxt point that Captain Colomb touclicd upon is diort scrricc. Thcrc I rcn- 
turc to say that hc 1133 niisapprchcndcd the term. “ Short scrricc,” to my mind, 
sllollld bc dcsignotcd thc pcriod of scrricc rcquired to train nnd clisciplinc n solclicr. 
~ h i 3  pcriod ]ins bccn laid domi bx tlic higlicst militnrr authority a3 thrcc cm3 for 
311 inkntry soldier. It i3 tlic period fordiicli tlic Prussinii Gorcrnnicnt EO tong and 
It i3 tlic pcriod of scmicc by which-a3 I gather from his 
spcccli in tlic IIousc of Lor&-thcDukcof Cninbridgc is prcpsrcd to  abide. I thcrc- 
for0 dctinc “short scrricc” for an ordinary soldier to bc thrcc ycnr3. In  thc C ~ S C  of 
mcn of snpcrior cducational qualifications, thc pcriod of scrricc i3 rcduccd in Priwia 
to om ycar, and tlic samc ride might possibly obtain in this country. Any attempt 
to combinc cfficicncy of tlis r c o d r  Army n-ith a shorter pcriod of scrricc will in nir 
opinion lcad to failurc. I maintain that scmicc in Inclia should bc an  cntircly scpa- 
n t c  cnwwncnt from thc short scrricc of our soldiers a t  homc. Irrcspcctirc of 
other c&%lcratioru, it L onc of the distinct rccorrrmcudations of tlic Royal Coni- 
mission on Recruiting t l n t  110 soldier should bo sent out to India until hc is 
wasoncd, and thcr lay domi two p a r s  for tlic ~ r i o d  of seasoning. IJy propod  
conforms to that &w. It is undcrstood tlmt t c Indian Gorcrnmcnt has r‘cmon- 
stntcd ngaiint tlic ch’ss of rccruits that 1 1 3 ~ 0  lately bccn scnt out to India, onc con- 
scqucncc bcing that tlic dcntli ratc nmong tlic troops of India ha3 incrczml by, I 
bclicre, 1 pcr ccnt. I tlicrcforc maintain that it i3 dcGrnblc that nonc but scasoncd 
soldier3 sliould bo scnt to India. I think also that nn nttcinpt to  crtcnd short 
wrricc to scrcn ycar3 wroulcl fail, bcmusc if wc wcrc to  take men for so long 3; pcriod 
from thcir industrial cmployxncnts, wc sliould not gct a su5cicnt supply of recruits 
to carry out to the full intcnt thc principlc of “short scmicc.” I think it will also 
bc nttciidcd with failurc if wc throw back on tlic ciril population, without pay or 
pension, rncn \rho liarc scrrcd ciglit or tcn p a r s  in tlic rcpular Army, n part of thz 
aenicc bcing in India. I think thc trac principlc upon nliicli to  gct rccruits is to  
send back crcry maii who has Ecrrcd hi3 full time in thc army, a contcntcd man, and 
then Iic will find two men rcsdy to comc in his placc. Witli a propcr ap liution of 
tho ‘‘ short scmicc” principle, probably 3 thrcc ycars’ scnicc, and taking t i e  Gorcrn- 
mcnt catimntc of recruits, mmcly 32,000 a ear, wc sliould bc ablc to  rcmit into thc 
~ tewmc 23,000 trained soldicrj 3 Fear; n n i  in that way we should TcV soon get an 
o5cicnt Rcscmc, and a largo proportion of our Militia forcc would crc long consist 
of rncn who had scrrcd thrco ycsr3 in tho Army. lvith rcgard to thc fiyrcs of 
Captain Colomb, thcy ngrcc rcry ncarly with thosc that I submittcd for discusion 
within tlic last fcw wccks. I calculated thc iicld Army in England, including thc 
3f&tin, at  260,000 men, and tlic garrison Army nt 120,000, of which n e d  propor- 
tion only ~ o d d  bc undcr tlic colours. 
n o  ncxt oint I noticc in his paper is tliat Iic adopts tlic doublc bnttdion orpni- 
ration, wliicl I nlwnys adrocatcd. I bclicrc tl& to bc a detail ncccssary for the 
~CCesfu l  npplimtiou of tho short senicc principlc to our csisting rcghcntnl 
organization. 
I mwt, ho~erc r ,  cntircly clisscnt from Captain Colomb’s modc of raising and local- 
Captain Colomb lias EO ably laid dolm. 
stoutly stood out. 
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izing rcgimcnts. 1 first took up thc qucstion of Army organization, conscqucnt on o 
conycr3ation nith Sir John Burgoync, in which hc said that hc i ~ o d d  fikc to scc thc 
short service priuciplo npplicd without brcaking up our old cstablishcd rcgimenta. 
Acting upon that suggcstion, I endearourccl to work out a plan such as would ndmit 
Of tho application of short Ecnicc to our regimental systcni, nnd maintain our long 
cstablishcd regiments; and I submit that I do not bclicrc Ixilization is ucccssarr. 
Tho Royal Commission on Recruiting say that i t  is ncithcr “dcsirablo” nor 
“ospcdicut” for our rcgulnr forccs. Localization is a ncccssary dctail of tlic 
Prussian principle, bccauo conscription is part of tlicir system, nnd localization i3 
introduccd to Icsscn tho tax of cnforccd pcraonal scmicc. Whcrc thcro is no con- 
scription, localization is not necessary. Tho proposal to localizc the infantry gircs 
riso t o  difficultics, especially tho Irish difiiculty, which I thinkit is unnecessary to 
crate.  I think Captain Colomb’s proposal to garrison Ircland b j  dctaclimcnts from 
English and Scotch regiments nnd to rcmoro tho Irish JLilitia from Ircland, for gar- 
rkon duty to  England in timc of war, b a sclicmc that will not commend itself to 
military mcn or to statcsmcn, nnd I am s u m  it would not bc farourably rcccivcd in 
Irclnnd. 
I am, howcrer, glhd t h t  Captain Colomb has ncknowlcdgcd this difficulty, and 
proposcd a rcmcdy, t h u  giring an opportunity of stating objcctions to  his pro- 
posals. 
Captain MOSCBIEFF: After thc r e g  nblo paper that has bccn rcad, and raltxiblc 
remarks that ham bccn m d c ,  on this subject, I am rcluctant to say anything ; but 
I a5ould like to notico tho views of tlic last spcakcr, and also 3 Etntcmcnt which fcll 
from Coloncl Ercljn. At the beginning of hi3 rcmarks I was inclincd to d i c r  from 
him, bccausc ho wished to bring thc subjcct back to inatters of dctail. I think we 
should fccl wry much indcbtcd to Captain Colomb for haring lifted thii qucstior. 
out of tho incxtricablo details with which it has bccn surrounded. I linrc no doubt 
that a t  thi3 momcnt they nro in another placc (thc IIousc of Commons) even more 
scriously cmbamsscd with thcso details than wc arc hcrc. I b c h r c  tliat this sub- 
ject, in its present statc. is much moro likely to rcccirc successful treatment, if dealt 
with first on gencml principlcs, n3 Captain Colomb lins trcatcd it to-night. Ho deals 
with matters whicli aro of vital nnd iinpcrial importnncc, ncccssarily embracing the 
wholo British possessions within their scopc. I mjsclf bclicrc that a great dcal of 
tho cmbarmssmcnt which has ariscn lately h:is bccn duo to tho action takcn by 
8 class of politickxu who say that their motive is pcaco-that they must hnro pcacc 
at any pricc. But I fcar that they nro the most warlilic pcoplo KO harc in this 
country, bccauso they shut thcir eyes to facts, nnd if Llicir policy is pursucd, it mill 
incrihbly lead to ngpss ion  on tho part of ambitious nnd warliko nciglibours 
against our rrcalth and commcrcial systcm. It is a maxim in wnr, that the sidc 
which takes tho offcnsire can alwnys conduct operations with smaller numbem, and 
at amallcr expcnso nnd suffcrin to its own pcoplo than thc sidc which remains upon 
tho dcfcnsirc. W o  hare seen ths illustrated in thc h t c  war. Our forcfatlicw did 
not tolerato a fallacy tlint affccts to ,some cxtcnt modcrn Engli3h opinion; their 
maxim was, that England should always fight her bnttlcs on nnothcr soil. And I 
think tho rcasons for continuing this policy arc grcater, and strongcr, now than crcr 
oxistea bcforc. n i o  same laws which apply to stmtcgy in war perhaps apply a150 
mth crcn grcatcr force to the policy of nations. If  England n11osrs hcrsclf to drift 
into juxtaposition with nny powcrful and aggrcssire military state, which cnn nlsn 
command n a r d  rcsourccs, IYC shall thcn ccrtainly harc to maintain much largcr 
armaments a t  much grcatcr expense than TO do a t  present. Tit11 our grcat colonial 
possossions and commcrcinl rclations, I bcliore thc only “ray in which xvc can command 
eccurity at a rcasonablc cxpcnsc, is to carry out on broad principles a well-orgmised 
sclicmo of combined nard and military dcfcncc, such as that which has been sketchcd 
out by Captain Colomb. With regard to some rcmarks from Coloncl Erclyn as to 
thc stat0 of tho Xiliti3, and bringing u3 back to details, there is on4 p i n t ,  in my 
opinion, of tho pcatcst importance, namely, that tlic Xilitin of this country is kcpt 
in a most unsatisfactory statc; it is hampcrcd in such a way that the men really do 
not know what their position i3, whether, in fact, they arc soldicrs or not ~oldicr3. 
I confess I mas wry much surprised to hcar tho account given by Coloncl X~olyn of 
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Captain' ~\LOSCP.ICFF: I got niy cominission early in 1856, but mas for EOmC timc 
witll tilo ~~r i t i s l l  Army in the Crimcn as 3 3Iilitia Officcr, and thcreforo did not join 
I belicrc that tho Militia, as a rule, if t5ey arc propcrIy 
treated, vould bc ns rcady to go to tho front, cithcr for dcfcnsirc or ohns i rc  open- 
tions, But they must bc 1)ropcrly trcatcd ; 
thcl mujt bc trcatctl as soldicr3 ; nnd if so, I bclicrc tlicy will r c spnd  to that treat- 
lncnt, rind may bc thoroudil r c k l  011. 1 hope in future that if tlic BIilitia b to 
bc calc&tcd upon as an ?nt&ml part of the military forcc of this countrr, that thc 
fashion of draining thnt forcc to fccdnnotlicr one should be gircii up ; nnd-that ahcn  
a[i!itb is called upon to act, i t  should bc permitted to do EO as battnlions, not ss 
indi&lua13. W e  know rciy wcll thnt tlic grcat majoritj of tlic rcgimcnts of the Line 
,SCT8 Once Nilitia rcgimcnts; tlicy hare bccn taken into thc Linc in timc ofwar, 
and llarc not bccn rctnrncd ngnin. If  any continpncy skould arisc in which t h b  
collntry i3 vitally tlircatcncd by c poncrfiil cncmy, IYC cannot crpcct to harc n 
sufficient rcsemc of tho rcgular Aruiy, hovcrcr much is donc to crcatc onc j wc 
Iuujt fall bnck upon tlic Militia, as has nlways been thc easc in serious need. " h c  
Militia should, tlicrcfore, bc put in 3 position to ham D ortion of its force always 
tllomugllly trainccl, 3% ~ C I I  ns thc Line, rind ready to  taac tlic field. m i e n  once 
England puts half-a-dozcn Xl i t ia  regimcnts 011 thc Continent, slic by that single nct 
111nkc3 hcrsclf 3 first-class i d i t m y  powcr ; bccausc its nuinbcrj arc incxliaustible, 
alld I am confidcnt of thi3, that if onc rcginicnt roluntccrcd to join tho rcgular 
.trm-j in the ficld, crcry rcgiinent that had bccn embodied long ciiou*li to ncquirc a 
;,roper esprit de corpswould bc ambitious to  do EO also, and to xarc  the same 
~lonours upon its colours. I cannot help thinking that our statesmen hare not used 
sufficiently that old constitutionnl forcc. They do not rcquirc to cvpy othcr systems 
to get eccurity. If  they mill only trcat the Militir in a proper way, I bclicrc ITC 
&uld bc nblc to meet 5 great many of the militaryrcquircmcnts of tlic country, and 
obtainat a small expcnsc tho security s c  dcrirc. There i3 no purchase question, or 
anything of that kind, to obstruct the path of reform nndrcorgnnization for thi3forco ; 
it  is nicrcly that our ru l c r~  cannot ECC the nature of tlic magnificent engine nt their 
dirposnl, whicli has only to bo put in propcr gcar to cnforcc, along with thc K a v  
and first Linc, tlic dccisionr of, or rcpcl outrages on, thc British mcc. I hopc to ficc 
the day when thc ILilitidwill bc mom acknowledgctl as an important part of our 
military 6ystcm, and when i t  is, 1 can coniidcntly predict that it d bc rcady to 
mcct nny requirements from it dcmandcd. 
Tlic CIIAIEXAS : Captain Colomb, will you now rep17 to  tho obacrrations mhich 
hare bccii msdc ? 
Captain J. R. COLOMD: First of all, with rcfercncc to Gcnerd Lefroy's 
rcmnrks, t h y  hare bccn a good deal corrcctcd by Coloncl Jcrrois. I n  bring- 
ing this subjcct bcforc you, I could only deal chiefly with tho defence of tlic 
Impcrid bascs. But if you look back to my papcrs, you will find that the prin- 
ciplc upon \rhicli I rest tlic wliolc systcm, is the dcfcncc of tho Empire, including 
tlic coloniea. And I m y  you must apply to thc Empirc ns 3 wliolc, the samc 
principlc which you would apply to any country. You must command Sour com- 
munications, ant1 iustcnd of scattering forces all orcr thc country, I placc fcrccs 
at tlic cross-roads, in point of fact ; and tlius bj strategy makc good tlic deficiency 
of numcr id  forces. Wit11 rcgard to thc British scsrlct, I quite ngcc it-ith General 
Lrfroy ; but I say I mould lct tlic British scarlet bo morn by tlic mcn who liarc thc 
morc direct interest in thc dcfenec of tlic colonies. !Chcy arc tlic peoplc of the 
colonies. I vould girc them crcry facility nitli rcgard to expcricnecd Olliccrs and 
military cquipmcnt ; but thc scarlet ~hould bc norii, I considrr, upon thc backs of 
thc population who arc most iiitcrcstcd in thc dircct dcfcncc. 3fy gcncrnl principlc 
this, that thssc colonies shosc position is not siich 83 to rcndcr them of great 
Vduc as military posts to tho Empire, must defend tlicmselrcs ; and thoso colonics 
allirh arc ncccssary to tho Empire as m i l i t q  posts wc must strain CTC ncrre to 
hold. I t  will thcrcfore be casily understood that s h c n  Gcnernl Lefroyim$xl that I 
rc,nilncnt a t  bnce. 
any portion of Hcr 3Injzstfs forces. 
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meant to nithdraw l n i l i t q  forces from thc colonics for financial rcasons,it is purclv 
on military p u n d s  that I would do so. With rcgad  to thc mariuc garrisons, 1 
wish to correct an iinprcssion conrcycd by one rcmark of Colonel Jcrroig. Thc 
alarine gnrrison is to my mind of rcat irnportancc, for this rcnson, to eecuro commu- 
nimtiono you will rcquirc a rcry ftrgc ficct, a fleet t ~ i a t  you will not likely hare GI 
p”cC ; and 1 think if  you hare your marinc garrisons or naval forccs at  your naral 
headquarters, and if you liar0 that naval forcc in rcscrrc asliorc, and tlic ships in 
rcscrrc, you can at  any nionient cspnnd your forccj for thc protection of colonial 
cornn:unication~ by EiUlplY dnlfting out o p r i s o n  nrmy to take it3 placc nsliore, ~ 0 1 1  
 rill thus rclicrc tlic iinnicnsc strain brought upon our homc rcscrics (ship3 and 
men) by doing so. Tlicrcforc, it is a part of my echcnic that thcsc stratcgical posi- 
tions should bo hcld during pcacc by nzrd forcca in rcscrrc. With rcgnrd to 
Coloncl Lcaliy’s rcnarks, I will make my an3wer as brief ns possiblc. First of all, 
with q a r d  to this qucstion of localization, I tliink he and I cliil‘cr morc in rcspcct 
of a particular tcrm. Hc adrocatcs fixcd hcad-quarters ; I udrocato Grcd head- 
q l~~r t c r s .  I ear localization is to makc military connectiona lio in tlic saxno dircction 
ns n man’s ciGi1 conncctious. (Coloncl LEAICY : Fixcd Iicad-qmrtcrj for artillcry, 
I say.) Witli rcgad  to short scrricc and localization, I am unnblc to ECC 
how tlic two things can bc scparatcd, and I will tell you shy. Thc objcct of 
short scrricc i3 to turn a ninn back upon thc civil popihtion and let him support 
himself, holding kin: liablc to rejoin tho military scrricc. That man is absolutely 
scrring in n particular district ; and he will continuo to scrvc as long a3 he is in tlic 
Rcserrc in tlic district xrhcrc his ciril connection i3 strongest. Thcrcforc, I cannot 
ECC hot\- you can set  asidc considerations regarding lomlitj. l l i c  Ehorter tlic pcriod 
of Ecrricc, the strongcr nrc thc links that bind a man to n articular locality ; thcrc- 
forc, as rcgnrds tlic military machinery by sh ich  tho E!iort-r$rricc man is to bc 
supcrviscd and trained, tho more do circumstanccs connectcd wit11 locality influcncc 
thc construction of the military niaclduc. Colonel h a h y  lays grcat strcss upou thc 
fact of localization bciug ncccsary in I’russin, in ordcr “ to lesrcn thc personal tax.” 
I f  that i3 thc objcct of localization in Prussia, tlic grcatcr thc pmonal tax in 
military nrningcments, tlic more the rctainiiig fcc must bc increased to inducc rncn 
to  rcrrc under thc roluntary system in thc Bcserrc. Undcr tho roluntary system, 
I think, it is morc ncccssq  “ to lighten the prsonal tax.” Undcr tho compulsov 
system you can forcc any amount of iuconrenicucc upon rncn by law; but with re- 
3rd to  thc roluntary sjstcm, if you increasc tho pcrsonnl tas, you rclatircly 
L i n i s l i  thc induccrncnts to scrrc. ~~iercforc .  I say that if in any country slicrc 
thcrc ij cou~criptioii it is found necessary to diminish thc personal tas, a3 Colonel 
Lcahy call3 it, I ~ 3 - j  it is doubly ncccssary whcrc you h a w  tho roluntnry systcm. 
With  rcfercncc to thc a;c of rncn going to  Iudia, that is a pun, question of s l ien  
you enlist them. I n  Frussia they do not takc men till 20 years of age; and I should 
bc a strong advocate of trying to gct as many as possible orcr 20 ycars of nge. n c r c  
is B grcatcr rd l inycs3  on tlic part of thc rncn undcr 20 to cnlist ; thcrcforc, by 
IcnTing in pcacc a grcnt stratum ’of tho population untouched until you want 
suddcnly to  cnlist ncw rncn, an adrantagc is gained. With regard to thc fixcd 
Lcad-quarters of the artillery, I must jut  makc onc remark. I sas merely illus- 
trating a gcueral principlc when I named tho grcat fortrcascs ns the only hcad- 
quarters of thc garrison Army. !Chi3 is thc principle: That with regard t o  tllc 
head-quartem of tlic militia nrtillery COrp3, vhcrcrer thcrc is 3 battcry of stratcgical 
importance, therc I say yoic sliould h i rc  militia RrtillerT, and noahcrc c1sc.u 
‘Ilo CXIAI~XAS :You harc licard Captain Colomb’s rcry raluablc pnpcr. I tEnk  
it reflects wry  grcnt credit upon our Ecrricc that thrcc such raluablo papers a3 
Captain Colomb 1133 read, Colonel Lcaliy has mad. and 3fajor Edwar~ls has pub- 
lished, should liarc been produccd. They show that we harc in the scriico men sho 
= I desirc to  remark that I did not reply to  thc objection raised-“ that thc 
R o p l  Commission of 18GG thought localization ncithcr cxpcdient nor dcsinblc ’I- 
bcuuso thc Commission reported in farour of long serrice, and I only consider 
localization to be necessary in the cwc of short scrvicc. 
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tllink dcepl,-, and d o  czprcss tlicmsdrcs wcll on such important niilitary subjccts. 
d la tc rcr  our dcficicncic~ ill otlicr rcspccts, no linrc men among 11s d i 0  
t~ loroug~l l~  understand tho want3 of our scrricc. I congmtuhto you spnn anot~icr 
llot only upon d n t  YOU llarc head, but upon what you \Till not hcar, for as 
your ~llairinan, it is not my intention to detain you a t  any Icngtlr. 1 dnrcsay p u  
m.ill bear ITith mc for 3 moment d d C  I lnako allusion to tlic rcfcrcncc m d c  by thc 
I rcfcr to tho important dicussion that is taking 
to-night iu Parliament upon army mattcrs. Wc must all be nirnrc that tho 
.isjUc of t b t  diiscussion must be of grcat good or @cat cril to our scrricc. I an1 
6,,rc r o ~ l  xdvill join mo in wishing that that. discussion may cnd, shatcrcr may bc tllc 
issue, in rctaining in tho a m  that uobk class of gcntlcmcn d i o  now fill tllc rinks 
of commissioned officcra. I f  we prcscrrc thc same fine youth, tlic snmc noble 
~ ~ ~ & l ~  manhood, tho same gcntlc English blood in our coinmksioiicd rank ,  I am suz tllc 0ficcr3 of tho futuro wiII rcapoud most cliccrfully and most aueccssiu~~r t o  
tilc appeal tlint thc Gorcrnment and the bountry arc now making to  the Office& 
tilc h n y ,  in tlicir awakcncd 6cnw of tho importnncc of scicntiGc education. I am 
ollc of thojc d o  admirc tho xouth of our A r q .  Aftcr an cxpcricncc of 51 ycars, 
1 t l h k  they arc the lincst youth in tho world, and tlint tlicy do not dcserw thc rc- 
proac~l that i3 cast upon tficm, Tiz., that thcy donot nttcnd to profcssional and scicn- 
ticc cdumtion. Thc laches liar0 bccn 011 tho art of Gorcrnmcnt. Thcrc nn3 niy om1 
bclorcd fatlicr, a prncticdy scicutific man, d o  for )-can mar imploring thc Gorcm- 
mcllt not to abandon tlicir cducationd institutions, but rather to strcngthcn and 
incrcasc tl~cm. But no, tlicsc wcrc all nbandoncd, and thc imporcrishcd Institution 
allich produccd a fav cducatcd I U C ~ ,  \r= nbaolutclg stranglcd. Thc Gorcrnn~cut 
discrcditcd professional linowlcdgc by not cmp!ojing thcsc mcn. IIcncc it is that our 
h n y i s  not EO profcssionally ud l  cducatcd a3 it  should bc. But 3 ncwcn i3 cornin 
I rcpcat that if tho mmc good and gcntlc blood is kcpt in tho Amy, I shnfi 
Imrc no fcar 33 to  its future. But thcrc ma3 in tlic IIouso of Comnions thc night 
bcforc k s t  two rcaoons assipcd for doing away with purchsc, which I entirely and 
uttcrly rcpudiatc. AS I rcad in .the papers, i t  was stated as one reason for 
Cloing away with purchsc, that tlic purcliasc Officer3 ncrcr went on scmico in 
tho ficld, or upon scrrico hi thc colonica, I\-ithout thinking of tho dangcr they incurred 
in conncxion with tho prices of their corninissionr. 1 call to witness against this 
etatciucnt thc blood of our noblc Engli&x~~cn that has bccn poured out like vater, 
mthout onc Sing10 thought Of COIWXpcnCn. hd 1 utterly dcny thc other rcnson 
etatcd, &, tlint scientific knowled.gc is not to bc ncquirrd by purcliasc Officcrs. I 
e d  a3 cridcncc against that asscrtion thc history of thc past. Ilierc was Sir acorgc 
Murray, Sir Cliarlcs Xapier, Lord Ilardingc, aiid a galaxy of men, all purchasc mcn, 
who wcrc traincd under my onn fnthcr. I E ~ F  thc purckasc sptcru La3 produccd 
men of thc wry  greatest cmincncc, not only in practical profcssional hoalcdgc, 
but iu profcssional Ecicncc. l'hcrcforc, I assert that two wrong rcaeons wcrc 
oaeipcd for doinn away with purchase. If  it be donc away with, I am surc you dl 
all join mc in &ing, God p a n t  that it niay turn out for tho bcst for our scrricc. 
any 
spcal;er3 to auothcr place. 
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